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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
War Plans Division suggested the latter solution in August, then
turned to fruitless efforts to reach an agreement by modifying the
present By September, General McNair had become skepti-
cal of the possibility of securing the authority requisite for effective
functioning of his office.lo0 From the August deliberations on, the
AAF favored drastic reorganization. O n 6 October the Air Staff pro-
rogued for duration of the emergency all attempts to secure complete
independence of the air force.’” This decision served merely to con-
centrate all efforts toward achieving a parity with the ground forces,
which seemed impossible of attainment under the present status and
constituency of GHQ. During the late summer and early fall, various
expedients were examined by members of the Air Staff and by con-
sultants drawn from the Bureau of the Budget.lo2 On 2 4 October
General Spaatz, Chief of the Air Staff, forwarded to W P D a vigorous
objection to the existing organization, recommending the abolition of
GHQ and the establishment, under the Chief of Staff and a compact
General Staff, of autonomous air, ground, and service forces. This
proposal met with ‘‘100 per cent non-concurrences.” l o 3 A month
later, on 2 5 November, General Arnold recommended to the Chief
of Staff a reorganization of the War Department along similar lines
and the creation of a military policy staff for the President which
should include members from the several services and appropriate
civilian agencies.lo4The second part of this scheme lay entirely outside
the jurisdiction of General Marshall; but he was “favorably im-
pressed” by Arnold’s design for the War Department, and on 28
November he directed WPD to develop a detailed plan incorporating
its principal
Brig. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, an air officer who had been drawn
into the General Staff under the recent liberalizing policy, was put in
charge of the project, H e was recalled from his current assignment
with the special observers in London, arriving in Washington just
after the Japanese attack in the Pacific and just in time to be named
to the Roberts Commission to investigate the disaster at Pearl
Harb0r.l“ Thus delayed, it was early February before McNarney’s
group had determined the general character of the reorganization. The
views of the AAF were presented to McNarney by a special com-
mittee appointed by Arnold and headed by Lt. Col. B. E. Gates.lo7
General Headquarters was not consulted until 5 February, but Gen-
eral McNair had long since been convinced of the impractical nature
2 6 2

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