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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 125 …an invading army. For that job they were well equipped, trained, and organized. Though the Luftwaff…
  • p. 127 …For the first time, German parachute troops were successfully employed when the Nazi forces invaded Holland…
  • p. 131 …equipment for moving an invading force across the intervening waters. The army itself, caught unprepared, required…
  • p. 134 …By the first of June the British had been forced to yield Crete to the invaders…
  • p. 183 …Nevertheless, a land army should be prepared to invade the continent and Germany itself. T h…
  • p. 246 …this effort." Apparently the course of the invaders plotted earlier in the morning was not utilized…
  • p. 263 …tanks, but they too “strafed and restrafed the invaders.” As Lt. Samuel H. Marrett, squadron commander…
  • p. 461 …the invading forces was merely preliminary to the bringing in of bombers in preparation for the…
  • p. 493 …Its nickel and chrome mines were readily accessible to an invader. Admiral King believed that the…
  • p. 522 …after the action; not until the war ended and the teams of interrogators invaded Japan was…
  • p. 529 …There was no intention of invading the Alaskan mainland, or even Dutch Harbor; the objective was…
  • p. 535 …Four of the most efficient carriers had gone down, carrying with them the hopes of Admiral…
  • p. 559 …the latter presented the more immediate need for reinforcement. Tavoy had fallen to Japanese invaders as…
  • p. 630 …The Netherlands East Indies and Burma, already invaded, were doomed. T h e Indian Ocean was…
  • p. 633 …to the preliminary strategic bombardment and only modestly to direct support of the invading force. A…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
War Plans Division suggested the latter solution in August, then
turned to fruitless efforts to reach an agreement by modifying the
present By September, General McNair had become skepti-
cal of the possibility of securing the authority requisite for effective
functioning of his office.lo0 From the August deliberations on, the
AAF favored drastic reorganization. O n 6 October the Air Staff pro-
rogued for duration of the emergency all attempts to secure complete
independence of the air force.’” This decision served merely to con-
centrate all efforts toward achieving a parity with the ground forces,
which seemed impossible of attainment under the present status and
constituency of GHQ. During the late summer and early fall, various
expedients were examined by members of the Air Staff and by con-
sultants drawn from the Bureau of the Budget.lo2 On 2 4 October
General Spaatz, Chief of the Air Staff, forwarded to W P D a vigorous
objection to the existing organization, recommending the abolition of
GHQ and the establishment, under the Chief of Staff and a compact
General Staff, of autonomous air, ground, and service forces. This
proposal met with ‘‘100 per cent non-concurrences.” l o 3 A month
later, on 2 5 November, General Arnold recommended to the Chief
of Staff a reorganization of the War Department along similar lines
and the creation of a military policy staff for the President which
should include members from the several services and appropriate
civilian agencies.lo4The second part of this scheme lay entirely outside
the jurisdiction of General Marshall; but he was “favorably im-
pressed” by Arnold’s design for the War Department, and on 28
November he directed WPD to develop a detailed plan incorporating
its principal
Brig. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, an air officer who had been drawn
into the General Staff under the recent liberalizing policy, was put in
charge of the project, H e was recalled from his current assignment
with the special observers in London, arriving in Washington just
after the Japanese attack in the Pacific and just in time to be named
to the Roberts Commission to investigate the disaster at Pearl
Harb0r.l“ Thus delayed, it was early February before McNarney’s
group had determined the general character of the reorganization. The
views of the AAF were presented to McNarney by a special com-
mittee appointed by Arnold and headed by Lt. Col. B. E. Gates.lo7
General Headquarters was not consulted until 5 February, but Gen-
eral McNair had long since been convinced of the impractical nature
2 6 2

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.