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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
F U N D A M E N T A L B A S E S O F S T R A T E G Y
States.g3T o those most intimately concerned, this directive and that
of 3 July extending the responsibilities of GHQ might seem to overlap
in respect to authority for operational planning and control. Divergent
attitudes toward the role of air power made difficult any substantial
agreement. The newly created Air Staff clearly indicated a desire to
extend the powers of the AAF along lines parallel, rather than sub-
ordinate, to those of GHQ. Such action would have in effect reduced
GHQ to a ground force command, a trend which its leaders objected
to but which seems to have been acceptable to WPD. In these circum-
stances, there was then much to justify WPD’s judgment that relations
between General Headquarters and the Army Air Forces were “in-
definite and unsatisfactory.” 9 4
General McNair was determined to preserve the authority of GHQ
against threatened encroachments from the AAF. Early in July he
secured from General Arnold an oral disclaimer of any intent to in-
fringe in the realm of operational command; the latter wrote, confirm-
ing his declaration, “There is no thought of aerial combat operations
controlled by the Air Force Combat Command, coincident with simi-
lar operations controlled by a theater commander.” 9 5 Nevertheless,
McNair seems to have felt that the AAF was striving for independent
command; apropos of a reorganization suggested by W P D he com-
mented that “the Chief of the Army Air Forces does not command
the aviation of overseas garrisons-at least not yet.” 9 6 O n 1 5 August,
McNair defined in detail his concept of the relationship between the
AAF and GHQ in a memorandum specifically calculated to prevent
any intrusion on the latter’s authority over operational planning and
His anxiety was not ill founded; already the War Depart-
ment had initiated deliberations which were to result, some seven
months later, in the abolition of GHQ and the extension of air force
authority. In its efforts toward that end, the AAF received effective
support from WPD.
Wishing to settle the broad issues raised by the directive of 3 July
and General McNair’s criticism thereof, General Marshall appointed
a board representing GHQ, the several sections of the General Staff,
and the Army Air Forces. Convened on 14 August, the board soon
recommended “a major reorganization of the War Department.” ’*
T w o alternatives seemed possible: to increase the powers of GHQ
along lines which McNair had suggested; or to reduce it to a ground
force command comparable to the AAF and add a service of supplies.
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