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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 75 …In the North Pacific only the narrow Bering Strait separated Siberia from Alaska, and farther south…
  • p. 242 …O R+ POI NT HAWAIIAN I SLA PACIFIC OCEAN 196 o w s U I DS
  • p. 322 …any one of many points in both oceans and along our coast lines and against the…
  • p. 332 …The shots seemed designed to punctuate the President’s statement that “the broad oceans which have…
  • p. 387 …Another Indian Ocean route was proposed that would have connected Mombasa with Ceylon or Bangalore, India…
  • p. 480 …Nimitz as commander in chief of the Pacific Ocean Area, whose responsibilities included the maintenance of…
  • p. 489 …Defense of the South Pacific Route It has been indicated elsewhere that the fear of just…
  • p. 515 …Chester Nimitz, commander in chief of the Pacific Ocean Area, could not know of the debates…
  • p. 537 …Pacific Ocean,’ but the division of command between the Army and Navy in the Pacific naturally…
  • p. 630 …T h e United States was asked to provide additional air strength for the Pacific, to…
  • p. 775 …Transport Cornand‘s Ocean Ferry (London, 1945), pp. 5-19; Summary of Information covering the organization…
  • p. 791 …ON1 Combat Narratives, Early Raids in the Pacific Ocean, I Feb.-ro Mar. 1942; RAAF Intel…
  • p. 797 …This action was to be co-ordinated with an operation in the South Pacific against Tulagi…
  • p. 833 …Headquarters, VIII Bomber Command, High Wycombe Prime Minister Pacific Ocean Area New Caledonia Task Force Plan…
  • p. 850 …336407 3537 356, 3803 395-96, q857 496 India-China Ferry, organization, 508 Indian Ocean, 33…
  • p. 856 …I , 432, 477 Pacific Fleet (US.), 137, 19697, 236, 272-73 Pacific Ocean Area, 419, 452…
F U N D A M E N T A L B A S E S O F S T R A T E G Y
States.g3T o those most intimately concerned, this directive and that
of 3 July extending the responsibilities of GHQ might seem to overlap
in respect to authority for operational planning and control. Divergent
attitudes toward the role of air power made difficult any substantial
agreement. The newly created Air Staff clearly indicated a desire to
extend the powers of the AAF along lines parallel, rather than sub-
ordinate, to those of GHQ. Such action would have in effect reduced
GHQ to a ground force command, a trend which its leaders objected
to but which seems to have been acceptable to WPD. In these circum-
stances, there was then much to justify WPD’s judgment that relations
between General Headquarters and the Army Air Forces were “in-
definite and unsatisfactory.” 9 4
General McNair was determined to preserve the authority of GHQ
against threatened encroachments from the AAF. Early in July he
secured from General Arnold an oral disclaimer of any intent to in-
fringe in the realm of operational command; the latter wrote, confirm-
ing his declaration, “There is no thought of aerial combat operations
controlled by the Air Force Combat Command, coincident with simi-
lar operations controlled by a theater commander.” 9 5 Nevertheless,
McNair seems to have felt that the AAF was striving for independent
command; apropos of a reorganization suggested by W P D he com-
mented that “the Chief of the Army Air Forces does not command
the aviation of overseas garrisons-at least not yet.” 9 6 O n 1 5 August,
McNair defined in detail his concept of the relationship between the
AAF and GHQ in a memorandum specifically calculated to prevent
any intrusion on the latter’s authority over operational planning and
His anxiety was not ill founded; already the War Depart-
ment had initiated deliberations which were to result, some seven
months later, in the abolition of GHQ and the extension of air force
authority. In its efforts toward that end, the AAF received effective
support from WPD.
Wishing to settle the broad issues raised by the directive of 3 July
and General McNair’s criticism thereof, General Marshall appointed
a board representing GHQ, the several sections of the General Staff,
and the Army Air Forces. Convened on 14 August, the board soon
recommended “a major reorganization of the War Department.” ’*
T w o alternatives seemed possible: to increase the powers of GHQ
along lines which McNair had suggested; or to reduce it to a ground
force command comparable to the AAF and add a service of supplies.
261

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.