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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 386 …More threatening were Rommel’s forces in North Africa, for the very existence of the air…
  • p. 387 …the route over which the Far East Air Force had received its thirty-five heavy bombers…
  • p. 551 …Formerly commander of the Far East Air Force in the Philip- * See above, pp. 396-97…
  • p. 561 …of an air force, depended upon a line of communications extending across the Indian and At…
  • p. 570 …the American air force would be used in the Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean area…
  • p. 571 …Accordingly, on 24 May the order committing the Tenth Air Force to operations under RAF supervision…
  • p. 577 …involved in estab- lishing and operating an air force in Asia. The report of the Grady…
  • p. 630 …Policy for Disposition of US and British Air Forces.” l6 This memorandum greatly extended the scope…
  • p. 797 …MacArthur argued that now was a pro- pitious moment to rush forces from the Indian and…
  • p. 819 …5 8 - 6 7 Eighth Air Force, I, 326ff.; Achtung Indianer, a history of VIII FC…
  • p. 850 …See also CBI; Air Forces, Tenth AF. 336407 3537 356, 3803 395-96, q857 496 India…
F U N D A M E N T A L B A S E S O F S T R A T E G Y
States.g3T o those most intimately concerned, this directive and that
of 3 July extending the responsibilities of GHQ might seem to overlap
in respect to authority for operational planning and control. Divergent
attitudes toward the role of air power made difficult any substantial
agreement. The newly created Air Staff clearly indicated a desire to
extend the powers of the AAF along lines parallel, rather than sub-
ordinate, to those of GHQ. Such action would have in effect reduced
GHQ to a ground force command, a trend which its leaders objected
to but which seems to have been acceptable to WPD. In these circum-
stances, there was then much to justify WPD’s judgment that relations
between General Headquarters and the Army Air Forces were “in-
definite and unsatisfactory.” 9 4
General McNair was determined to preserve the authority of GHQ
against threatened encroachments from the AAF. Early in July he
secured from General Arnold an oral disclaimer of any intent to in-
fringe in the realm of operational command; the latter wrote, confirm-
ing his declaration, “There is no thought of aerial combat operations
controlled by the Air Force Combat Command, coincident with simi-
lar operations controlled by a theater commander.” 9 5 Nevertheless,
McNair seems to have felt that the AAF was striving for independent
command; apropos of a reorganization suggested by W P D he com-
mented that “the Chief of the Army Air Forces does not command
the aviation of overseas garrisons-at least not yet.” 9 6 O n 1 5 August,
McNair defined in detail his concept of the relationship between the
AAF and GHQ in a memorandum specifically calculated to prevent
any intrusion on the latter’s authority over operational planning and
His anxiety was not ill founded; already the War Depart-
ment had initiated deliberations which were to result, some seven
months later, in the abolition of GHQ and the extension of air force
authority. In its efforts toward that end, the AAF received effective
support from WPD.
Wishing to settle the broad issues raised by the directive of 3 July
and General McNair’s criticism thereof, General Marshall appointed
a board representing GHQ, the several sections of the General Staff,
and the Army Air Forces. Convened on 14 August, the board soon
recommended “a major reorganization of the War Department.” ’*
T w o alternatives seemed possible: to increase the powers of GHQ
along lines which McNair had suggested; or to reduce it to a ground
force command comparable to the AAF and add a service of supplies.
261

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.