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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 370 …Reichers took a route by way of Cairo across central Africa, the South Atlantic, and up…
  • p. 371 …I 0,000 miles separated Miami from Cairo.23An airplane leaving southern Florida traveled 4,000…
  • p. 372 …of Africa and across central Africa to Cairo. Ferrying operations over the South Atlantic route had…
  • p. 375 …Takoradi following the completion of deliveries to Cairo, and for hauling critical items of supply east…
  • p. 378 …7 December the service was extended to Cairo and beyond.54 Before operations could begin, Pan…
  • p. 379 …Maxwell had been established at Cairo on I 3 September 1941, with responsibilities similar to those…
  • p. 380 …to the opening of a service to Cairo over the South Atlantic route. Two survey flights…
  • p. 381 …R Y I N G Washington for Cairo prior to 7 December, each carrying important military…
  • p. 382 …of the bombers departed Bolling Field for Cairo on 20 November. Unfortunately, on the trip across…
  • p. 385 …Lend-lease planes for Russia were flown through Cairo to Basra or to Tehran, where they…
  • p. 387 …for ferrying up the old Cape-to-Cairo airway. Although more exposed to attack, Takoradi and…
  • p. 388 …Tampa-Trinidad- Belem-Natal-Accra-Khartoum-Cairo-Habbaniya-Karachi.At Karachi the LB-3o’s under…
  • p. 390 …24 shuttle services to Great Britain and Cairo. The first step was to establish a ferrying…
  • p. 391 …parts stocked by the RAF a t Cairo, all spare parts had to be shipped from…
  • p. 395 …assembled and then ferried across Africa to Cairo. Within a few months after Pearl Harbor, the…
  • p. 407 …Harbor, first to Britain and later to Cairo, had been little more than courier services and…
  • p. 411 …from their normal operations between Washington and Cairo and sent to the Far East. A plan…
  • p. 412 …Kester-the pilot who had inaugurated the Washington- Cairo transport service in November-was lost off…
  • p. 413 …In February, Transcontinental & Western Air began operating a shuttle service from Washington to Cairo, using two…
  • p. 629 …5) MAGNET (Northern Ireland); (6) Task Force CAIRO (to Egypt).g On 2 7 January the…
  • p. 630 …one group of heavies set up for CAIRO was to go out only after the initial…
  • p. 778 …CM-IN, MA Cairo to M E I D 65. CM-IN, London (Brett) to Trip…
  • p. 779 …1942; CM- IN, Cairo (Fellen) to T A G (Adler for Arnold), 8754 Amseg, 3 Feb…
  • p. 786 …1942; msg. $762, Cairo to T A G , 4 Feb. IWZ; msg. #13, Brett to T…
  • p. 830 …BOLERO BR CAA C/AAF C/AC CAIRO C/AS C A T F CCRC CCS…
  • p. 844 …5 Cagayan (Mindanao), 219 Cagayan Valley, 208 Cairo, 3 1 ~ 2 1 , 325-26, 328-29…
F U N D A M E N T A L B A S E S O F S T R A T E G Y
States.g3T o those most intimately concerned, this directive and that
of 3 July extending the responsibilities of GHQ might seem to overlap
in respect to authority for operational planning and control. Divergent
attitudes toward the role of air power made difficult any substantial
agreement. The newly created Air Staff clearly indicated a desire to
extend the powers of the AAF along lines parallel, rather than sub-
ordinate, to those of GHQ. Such action would have in effect reduced
GHQ to a ground force command, a trend which its leaders objected
to but which seems to have been acceptable to WPD. In these circum-
stances, there was then much to justify WPD’s judgment that relations
between General Headquarters and the Army Air Forces were “in-
definite and unsatisfactory.” 9 4
General McNair was determined to preserve the authority of GHQ
against threatened encroachments from the AAF. Early in July he
secured from General Arnold an oral disclaimer of any intent to in-
fringe in the realm of operational command; the latter wrote, confirm-
ing his declaration, “There is no thought of aerial combat operations
controlled by the Air Force Combat Command, coincident with simi-
lar operations controlled by a theater commander.” 9 5 Nevertheless,
McNair seems to have felt that the AAF was striving for independent
command; apropos of a reorganization suggested by W P D he com-
mented that “the Chief of the Army Air Forces does not command
the aviation of overseas garrisons-at least not yet.” 9 6 O n 1 5 August,
McNair defined in detail his concept of the relationship between the
AAF and GHQ in a memorandum specifically calculated to prevent
any intrusion on the latter’s authority over operational planning and
His anxiety was not ill founded; already the War Depart-
ment had initiated deliberations which were to result, some seven
months later, in the abolition of GHQ and the extension of air force
authority. In its efforts toward that end, the AAF received effective
support from WPD.
Wishing to settle the broad issues raised by the directive of 3 July
and General McNair’s criticism thereof, General Marshall appointed
a board representing GHQ, the several sections of the General Staff,
and the Army Air Forces. Convened on 14 August, the board soon
recommended “a major reorganization of the War Department.” ’*
T w o alternatives seemed possible: to increase the powers of GHQ
along lines which McNair had suggested; or to reduce it to a ground
force command comparable to the AAF and add a service of supplies.
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.