“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
F U N D A M E N T A L B A S E S O F S T R A T E G Y
a single theater; in the summer of 1941both the European Axis and
Japan loomed as probable enemies and responsibilities for hemisphere
defense involved the establishment of widely scattered bases and de-
fense commands. Anglo-American plans had envisaged the establish-
ment of several theaters of operations, but firm commitment of the
field forces must depend in the initial stages of war upon enemy
strategy. Under these circumstances it did not seem wise for either
General Marshall or GHQ to take the field. W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to that
staff in spite of the directive of 3 July.86
That directive proved difficult to follow, since some of the func-
tions and powers prescribed therein were contingent upon unpre-
dictable circumstances. From the date of its issue, General McNair
considered the authority granted GHQ unequal to the new respon-
sibilities, and on 2 5 July he requested an extension of his powers. T h e
chief difficulty lay in his lack of control over supplies, a weakness he
thought fatal to effective planning for, and command of, task forces.
Competing with the Navy and lend-lease for material resources, the
W a r Department was unwilling to relinquish its control over this
essential factor. Thus it was with restricted authority that GHQ, in
the months just before and after Pearl Harbor, planned operations and
dispatched task forces, some of which have been mentioned in earlier
passages of this chapter. But however important the matter of supply
may have been to GHQ, the issue of most immediate concern to the
Army air arm was its own relation to the new agency.
That conflict would arise between the air force and a GHQ donii-
nated by ground officers was to be expected; what occurred was no
more than a new phase of the dispute which had defied solution for
two decades. Widespread recognition of the importance of air power
in the European war and General Marshall’s sympathetic attitude to-
ward the Army’s air arm encouraged those officers who were dissatis-
fied with the organizational compromise of 1935. Rather than return
to the public campaign for a separate department of air, they now
directed their efforts toward securing greater powers within the W a r
Department. In these efforts they were opposed by GHQ as they had
earlier been by the General Staff, but the alignment was now less
uneven. T h e appointment of General Arnold as Deputy Chief of Staff
in October 1940 gave him immediate access to the Chief of Staff; and,
if the new office was not in the same chain of command as Arnold’s
2 5 9