The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
of opinion as to the most feasible solution for each. The reorganiza-
tion of March 1942 was essentially a compromise, a wartime expedient
which postponed rather than effected a final settlement. The imme-
diate background of this temporary solution may be sought in a three-
cornered struggle between the General Staff‘s War Plans Division,
General Headquarters, and the Army Air Forces. Much, though cer-
tainly not all, of the controversy turned on the relation of the air
arm to the military establishment.
General Headquarters was of recent origin, but the desirability of
such a staff in the event of war had long dominated Army thought.
The Harbord Board of 192I , drawing on the experience of the AEF
in 1917-18, had recommended establishment of a staff comparable to
Pershing’s GHQ which should channel War Department activities
into the theater of operations. T h e core of this headquarters was to
consist of the General Staff’s War Plans Division-indeed it was in
anticipation of such an eventual function that the latter office had been
created and charged with the preparation of over-all strategic plans.
Modified in detail in 1936, the Harbord plan assumed that a t outbreak
of war the Chief of Staff, or some other commander designated by
the President, would lead the field forces with a reinforced WPD as
his general headquarters. When Nazi victories of the spring of 1940
lent urgency to the mobilization of American military forces, an
initial step toward realizing this design was taken by the activation, on
2 6 July, of a “nucleus of GHQ.” Its original mission was to direct the
training of the tactical units of the Army, found in the main in the
four field armies, the armored force, and the GHQ Air Force.* Gen-
eral Marshall delegated effective control of GHQ to its chief of staff,
Brig. Gen. Leslie J. McNair, under whose able leadership a small group
of officers undertook the complex task of organizing and training the
fast-growing Army.84
A year later, on 3 July 1941,the mission of GHQ was extended to
include also the planning and command of operations; in General
Marshall’s words, “GHQ now supersedes War Plans Division in the
organization and control of task forces and operations.” 8 5 This was in
accord with the original intent, but the new arrangement did not
prove satisfactory. T h e Harbord report and the subsequent modifica-
tions of 1936 had conceived of a war involving a concerted effort in
* The last term is confusing, since it referred to an organization which had been
established in 1935, five years before the activation of GHQ itself.
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