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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 125 …an invading army. For that job they were well equipped, trained, and organized. Though the Luftwaff…
  • p. 127 …For the first time, German parachute troops were successfully employed when the Nazi forces invaded Holland…
  • p. 131 …equipment for moving an invading force across the intervening waters. The army itself, caught unprepared, required…
  • p. 134 …By the first of June the British had been forced to yield Crete to the invaders…
  • p. 183 …Nevertheless, a land army should be prepared to invade the continent and Germany itself. T h…
  • p. 246 …this effort." Apparently the course of the invaders plotted earlier in the morning was not utilized…
  • p. 263 …tanks, but they too “strafed and restrafed the invaders.” As Lt. Samuel H. Marrett, squadron commander…
  • p. 461 …the invading forces was merely preliminary to the bringing in of bombers in preparation for the…
  • p. 493 …Its nickel and chrome mines were readily accessible to an invader. Admiral King believed that the…
  • p. 522 …after the action; not until the war ended and the teams of interrogators invaded Japan was…
  • p. 529 …There was no intention of invading the Alaskan mainland, or even Dutch Harbor; the objective was…
  • p. 535 …Four of the most efficient carriers had gone down, carrying with them the hopes of Admiral…
  • p. 559 …the latter presented the more immediate need for reinforcement. Tavoy had fallen to Japanese invaders as…
  • p. 630 …The Netherlands East Indies and Burma, already invaded, were doomed. T h e Indian Ocean was…
  • p. 633 …to the preliminary strategic bombardment and only modestly to direct support of the invading force. A…
F U N D A M E N T A L B A S E S O F S T R A T E G Y
its member was the Chief of the Air Staff, Maj. Gen. Millard F.
Harmon. H e served also as chairman of a subsidiary group, the Muni-
tions Assignments Committee (Air), and the AAF in this body con-
tinued to play the important role it had previously enjoyed in the
Joint Aircraft Committee.82
As the war went on, the combined and joint machinery grew more
complex, the size of its personnel greater. It could not, in the nature
of things, wholly escape the taint of bureaucracy, and that its officers
could partially escape the standard “battle of the Pentagon” jokes was
perhaps due to the fact that they were more often housed in another
building. But the war, being global, was also complex and great in
size; the task of planning operations and deployments in every con-
tinent, of finding resources and establishing relative priorities-this
required a staff organized on a scale and in a manner hitherto un-
known in the United States. Perhaps the magnitude of the task can
be fully appreciated only by those who have made an intensive study
of the files of the Combined and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The respon-
sibility for keeping those records, incidentally, was no light one. It
was vested, at the two levels, in the Combined Secretariat and the
Joint Secretariat, which prepared and circulated the various draft and
final papers and which kept a permanent record of the proceedings
at staff meetings. Here again initial British influence was
The establishment of the new machinery for combined and joint
control of the war effort did much to secure for the air arm a position
commensurate with its growing size and power through the inclusion
of AAF representatives in each new agency. Concurrently, the War
Department was undergoing structural modifications which contrib-
uted to the same end. The reorganization which went into effect on
9 March 1942 was the fruit of months of study and debate precip-
itated by the military crisis of 1940-41; to understand the issues
involved, it is useful to recall briefly the nature of the Army’s admin-
istrative machinery when mobilization began. At that time most re-
sponsible leaders within the War Department were agreed that the
existing organization was ill attuned to the needs of modern war-
specifically :hat reforms should be instituted which aimed at decen-
tralization of staff work in Washington, at unity of command in the
field. In practice, those principles were difficult to reconcile, and
among the several agencies concerned there existed wide differences
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.