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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
The new Combined Intelligence Committee also continued an exist-
ing organi~ation.~’The American members, who formed the U.S.
Joint Intelligence Committee, consisted of the directors of intelligence
from the Army, Navy, and AAF, and representatives of the Depart-
ment of State, the Board of Economic Warfare, and the Coordinator
of Information. A full-time committee was also appointed to work
permanently with the British Joint Intelligence Committee in Wash-
ington.
The Combined Military Transportation Committee (CMTC) was
to advise the CCS on transportation problems involved in their various
projects, especially in respect to requirements for overseas move-
memx80 For any contemplated operation, the American and British
members were to determine the shipping which could be made avail-
able by each nation through consultation respectively with the War
Shipping Administration and the Ministry of War Transport. Where
combined use of shipping was involved, any adjustments necessary
should be referred to the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board.
Where lack of shipping or kindred factors (rail, port, etc.) threatened
to strangle an approved plan, the CMTC with the CPS were to report
to the Combined Chiefs to obtain the requisite priorities. American
membership consisted of the War Department’s G-4 and his chief
transportation officer, a representative of the AAF, the director of
the Naval Transportation Service, and his planning officer.
In view of the acute problems of distribution of air materiel, the
combined Munitions Assignments Board (MAB) was of special
importance to the AAF.8’ This extended to British as well as Amer-
ican production the idea of inter-Allied control which had been func-
tioning since 1940, but which was now made even more necessary
by the adoption of the Victory Program. The mission of the MAB
was to keep current estimates of U.S.-British munitions resources,
considering such variable factors as production achievements, materiel
reserves, rates of wastage, combat forces, shifts in strategy, etc.; and,
on the basis of these estimates, to recommend to the CCS schedules
for the allocation of materiel among the United Nations. Separate
boards sat in Washington and London to assign respectively munitions
produced in the United States and United Kingdom. A civilian, Harry
L. Hopkins, headed the board in Washington, which included repre-
sentatives of the Army, Navy, and AAF, and of the three British
services. It was a token of the importance of this board to the AAF that
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.