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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 125 …an invading army. For that job they were well equipped, trained, and organized. Though the Luftwaff…
  • p. 127 …For the first time, German parachute troops were successfully employed when the Nazi forces invaded Holland…
  • p. 131 …equipment for moving an invading force across the intervening waters. The army itself, caught unprepared, required…
  • p. 134 …By the first of June the British had been forced to yield Crete to the invaders…
  • p. 183 …Nevertheless, a land army should be prepared to invade the continent and Germany itself. T h…
  • p. 246 …this effort." Apparently the course of the invaders plotted earlier in the morning was not utilized…
  • p. 263 …tanks, but they too “strafed and restrafed the invaders.” As Lt. Samuel H. Marrett, squadron commander…
  • p. 461 …the invading forces was merely preliminary to the bringing in of bombers in preparation for the…
  • p. 493 …Its nickel and chrome mines were readily accessible to an invader. Admiral King believed that the…
  • p. 522 …after the action; not until the war ended and the teams of interrogators invaded Japan was…
  • p. 529 …There was no intention of invading the Alaskan mainland, or even Dutch Harbor; the objective was…
  • p. 535 …Four of the most efficient carriers had gone down, carrying with them the hopes of Admiral…
  • p. 559 …the latter presented the more immediate need for reinforcement. Tavoy had fallen to Japanese invaders as…
  • p. 630 …The Netherlands East Indies and Burma, already invaded, were doomed. T h e Indian Ocean was…
  • p. 633 …to the preliminary strategic bombardment and only modestly to direct support of the invading force. A…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
The new Combined Intelligence Committee also continued an exist-
ing organi~ation.~’The American members, who formed the U.S.
Joint Intelligence Committee, consisted of the directors of intelligence
from the Army, Navy, and AAF, and representatives of the Depart-
ment of State, the Board of Economic Warfare, and the Coordinator
of Information. A full-time committee was also appointed to work
permanently with the British Joint Intelligence Committee in Wash-
ington.
The Combined Military Transportation Committee (CMTC) was
to advise the CCS on transportation problems involved in their various
projects, especially in respect to requirements for overseas move-
memx80 For any contemplated operation, the American and British
members were to determine the shipping which could be made avail-
able by each nation through consultation respectively with the War
Shipping Administration and the Ministry of War Transport. Where
combined use of shipping was involved, any adjustments necessary
should be referred to the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board.
Where lack of shipping or kindred factors (rail, port, etc.) threatened
to strangle an approved plan, the CMTC with the CPS were to report
to the Combined Chiefs to obtain the requisite priorities. American
membership consisted of the War Department’s G-4 and his chief
transportation officer, a representative of the AAF, the director of
the Naval Transportation Service, and his planning officer.
In view of the acute problems of distribution of air materiel, the
combined Munitions Assignments Board (MAB) was of special
importance to the AAF.8’ This extended to British as well as Amer-
ican production the idea of inter-Allied control which had been func-
tioning since 1940, but which was now made even more necessary
by the adoption of the Victory Program. The mission of the MAB
was to keep current estimates of U.S.-British munitions resources,
considering such variable factors as production achievements, materiel
reserves, rates of wastage, combat forces, shifts in strategy, etc.; and,
on the basis of these estimates, to recommend to the CCS schedules
for the allocation of materiel among the United Nations. Separate
boards sat in Washington and London to assign respectively munitions
produced in the United States and United Kingdom. A civilian, Harry
L. Hopkins, headed the board in Washington, which included repre-
sentatives of the Army, Navy, and AAF, and of the three British
services. It was a token of the importance of this board to the AAF that
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.