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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
F U N D A M E N T A L B A S E S O F S T R A T E G Y
theater or continental commander. Yet to an important degree the
broad direction of the war strategy was the work of the Combined
Chiefs themselves. This meant, save for the final decision by the civil-
ian government chiefs, that the war effort was controlled by a com-
mittee. T h e faults inherent in committee rule were not always absent.
It is difficult to achieve perfect unanimity of opinion among eight
strong-minded men, each accustomed to command and each moti-
vated by a different combination of national, service, and personal
factors. Yet on each issue, agreement-or consent-was desirable;
there was no formal voting or majority rule. In view of the paralyzing
possibilities of what amounted to the liberum veto, it was fortunate
that, whatever clashes of opinion may have occurred, the members
of the CCS were able in most issues to compromise their several sug-
gestions in a decision that could be accepted by all. One fact of ex-
treme importance for the United States was that the membership of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff remained unchanged, after the appointment
of Admiral Leahy, until after the war ended; this continuity in per-
sonnel, so unusual in a military body, contributed much to smoothness
of operation of the JCS.
In the interests of efficiency it was desirable that the Combined
Chiefs of Staff be provided with permanent staff sections. T h e British
paper on post-ARCADIA collaboration had designated several of
the required agencies, again based on British models, and these were
set up by CCS directives at the time that body achieved its formal
organization. For the most part the new offices merely continued, in
a more formal guise and under new designations, the machinery
which had grown up at ARCADIA. T h e form the new sections
assumed then was that of Anglo-American committees rather than
of the conventional “G’s” of the U.S. Army General Staff.
Although there was no hierarchical arrangement of the several sec-
tions, those being coequal in status and on terms of mutual inter-
change of communication, the Combined Planning Staff occupied a
central position v i s - h i s the Combined Chiefs of Staff .78 That section,
which had operated at ARCADIA as the Joint Planning Committee,
was charged with preparing such studies and plans as the CCS should
direct. Its membership included the chief planning officers of the U.S.
Army, Navy, and AAF, and similar representatives of the British
services. T h e American members, when sitting separately, constituted
also the US.Joint Planning Staff.
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