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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 125 …an invading army. For that job they were well equipped, trained, and organized. Though the Luftwaff…
  • p. 127 …For the first time, German parachute troops were successfully employed when the Nazi forces invaded Holland…
  • p. 131 …equipment for moving an invading force across the intervening waters. The army itself, caught unprepared, required…
  • p. 134 …By the first of June the British had been forced to yield Crete to the invaders…
  • p. 183 …Nevertheless, a land army should be prepared to invade the continent and Germany itself. T h…
  • p. 246 …this effort." Apparently the course of the invaders plotted earlier in the morning was not utilized…
  • p. 263 …tanks, but they too “strafed and restrafed the invaders.” As Lt. Samuel H. Marrett, squadron commander…
  • p. 461 …the invading forces was merely preliminary to the bringing in of bombers in preparation for the…
  • p. 493 …Its nickel and chrome mines were readily accessible to an invader. Admiral King believed that the…
  • p. 522 …after the action; not until the war ended and the teams of interrogators invaded Japan was…
  • p. 529 …There was no intention of invading the Alaskan mainland, or even Dutch Harbor; the objective was…
  • p. 535 …Four of the most efficient carriers had gone down, carrying with them the hopes of Admiral…
  • p. 559 …the latter presented the more immediate need for reinforcement. Tavoy had fallen to Japanese invaders as…
  • p. 630 …The Netherlands East Indies and Burma, already invaded, were doomed. T h e Indian Ocean was…
  • p. 633 …to the preliminary strategic bombardment and only modestly to direct support of the invading force. A…
F U N D A M E N T A L B A S E S O F S T R A T E G Y
theater or continental commander. Yet to an important degree the
broad direction of the war strategy was the work of the Combined
Chiefs themselves. This meant, save for the final decision by the civil-
ian government chiefs, that the war effort was controlled by a com-
mittee. T h e faults inherent in committee rule were not always absent.
It is difficult to achieve perfect unanimity of opinion among eight
strong-minded men, each accustomed to command and each moti-
vated by a different combination of national, service, and personal
factors. Yet on each issue, agreement-or consent-was desirable;
there was no formal voting or majority rule. In view of the paralyzing
possibilities of what amounted to the liberum veto, it was fortunate
that, whatever clashes of opinion may have occurred, the members
of the CCS were able in most issues to compromise their several sug-
gestions in a decision that could be accepted by all. One fact of ex-
treme importance for the United States was that the membership of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff remained unchanged, after the appointment
of Admiral Leahy, until after the war ended; this continuity in per-
sonnel, so unusual in a military body, contributed much to smoothness
of operation of the JCS.
In the interests of efficiency it was desirable that the Combined
Chiefs of Staff be provided with permanent staff sections. T h e British
paper on post-ARCADIA collaboration had designated several of
the required agencies, again based on British models, and these were
set up by CCS directives at the time that body achieved its formal
organization. For the most part the new offices merely continued, in
a more formal guise and under new designations, the machinery
which had grown up at ARCADIA. T h e form the new sections
assumed then was that of Anglo-American committees rather than
of the conventional “G’s” of the U.S. Army General Staff.
Although there was no hierarchical arrangement of the several sec-
tions, those being coequal in status and on terms of mutual inter-
change of communication, the Combined Planning Staff occupied a
central position v i s - h i s the Combined Chiefs of Staff .78 That section,
which had operated at ARCADIA as the Joint Planning Committee,
was charged with preparing such studies and plans as the CCS should
direct. Its membership included the chief planning officers of the U.S.
Army, Navy, and AAF, and similar representatives of the British
services. T h e American members, when sitting separately, constituted
also the US.Joint Planning Staff.
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.