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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 303 …of Naval Opera- tions; Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; Gen. George…
  • p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you know, is not only Chief…
  • p. 493 …Admiral King believed that the mines offered a tempting bait to the Japanese who were currently…
  • p. 526 …Hence Admiral King placed a bid for suffi- 461
  • p. 527 …t this stage of the war Admiral King had accepted the belief that his carrier planes…
  • p. 538 …plan by 2 9 June, when Admiral King submitted to the Joint Chiefs a proposal that…
  • p. 607 …type * O n 5 March 1942, Admiral King wrote to General Arnold as follows: “The experience…
  • p. 608 …s.’l A formal request by Admiral King to the Chief of the Army Air Forces…
  • p. 609 …In a letter of 9 March 1942 to Admiral King, he proposed “the estab- lishment of…
  • p. 614 …In June, Admiral King expressed the official Navy position on this point with the utmost clarity…
  • p. 615 …In a memorandum to Admiral King, General McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, on 26 May outlined…
  • p. 616 …viewed as a temporary deta~hment.?~ Admiral King’s reaction to these cautious proposals was expressed…
  • p. 618 …the same words as used by Admiral King a month earlier: the answer to the antisubmarine…
  • p. 621 …On 14 September, General Marshall wrote to Admiral King: “Experience with the First Bomber Command in…
  • p. 622 …T o General Marshall’s proposal of 14 September, Admiral King had replied that, although he…
  • p. 641 …54 A week later General Marshall, Admiral King, Harry Hopkins, and a small staff flew to…
  • p. 645 …that scheduled to operate from the United King- dom. Dry topic or no, organization must figure…
  • p. 684 …the principal air task in the United King- dom had long been conceived as strategic bombardment…
  • p. 707 …establishment of base depots in the United King- dom became the basis of action in January…
  • p. 724 …Implicit in all of the arrangements being made in the United King- dom was the belief…
  • p. 788 …Force, Pt. I ; Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King, First Official Report to the Secretary of the…
  • p. 793 …Memo for Adm, King from C/S, 17 Mar. 1 % ~ . 34. JPS 2I/j/D, 7…
  • p. 795 …4 Aug. 1942. 108. Zbid. 109. Adm. King’s Report on Battle of Midway, incl. in…
  • p. 797 …306, 29 June 1942; memos for Adm. King from Mar- shall, 26 June 1942, and for…
  • p. 802 …1942; CM-IN-0629, Chung- king to AGWAR, # # z , 3 Apr. 1942; memo for Gen. Arnold…
  • p. 805 …Ltr., Arnold to King, 2 5 Feb. 1942. certain evidence from all Allied and enemy sources…
  • p. 806 …Memo for King from McNarney, 26 May 1942. 7 1 . Ltr., King to Marshall, 10 June…
  • p. 807 …Ltr., Marshall to King, 14 Sept. 1942, TAB XIVA, in Bowles report; memo for C G…
  • p. 808 …to notes from Mar- shall and Adm. King). 3 2 . A I c m o for…
  • p. 814 …Forces to the United King- dom, App. A, 19 Aug. 1942. 50. Ltr., Col. H.L…
  • p. 851 …C.E., 48-50 Killin, Pfc, 219 Kilner Board, 1 2 0 Kimbolton, 63 I King…
  • p. 854 …in Chief, 515, 5 2 2 , 544. (see also King); controversy over air power vs. battleship…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
parity in cabinet representation and in military command; in the
American organization, the AAF was only a part of the Army. Brit-
ish practice had prevailed a t ARCADIA to the extent that AAF
members had met, in each committee, with their British counterparts
and on terms of quasi-equality with U.S. Army and Navy members.
That arrangement was perpetuated in the appointment of General
Arnold to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, though he was officially a
deputy chief of staff. In the second place the American members had
not liked the idea of including in the CCS a special representative of
the Minister of Defense, since the ready access to the President of
such a personal representative of Mr. Churchill might make difficult
the maintenance of normal military channels of communication and
control. The arrangement was later equalized by the appointment in
July of Adm. William D. Leahy as personal chief of staff to President
Roosevelt in place of Admiral Stark.'* It was apparently the in-
fluence of the CCS organization which determined the formation
of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), made up of the four Amer-
ican members. There was no official charter establishing this com-
mittee,75 but by the end of February it had assumed responsibilities
toward the American war effort comparable to those of the CCS at
the combined level.
For the CCS, responsibilities were specifically en~merated.?~They
were to include, under the heads of the two governments, the formu-
lation and execution of policies and plans concerning: ( I ) the strate-
gic conduct of the war; ( 2 ) a broad program of production conceived
in terms of that strategy; ( 3 ) allocation of raw materials and weapons;
and (4) assignment of shipping for personnel and materiel. Procedure
in carrying out these tasks had already been described in the directive
issued to the supreme Allied commander of the ABDA area.?' On all
important military matters outside the jurisdiction of the theater
commanders, the Combined Chiefs were charged with developing
recommendations and submitting them to the President and Prime
Minister for approval. The issues under consideration might originate
with the theater commanders, with the government of any of the
United Nations, with the U.S. or British chiefs of staff, or eventually
with their subordinate agencies. T h e functions of the CCS (and simi-
larly of the JCS) were properly staff rather than command. Ultimate
decisions, of course, lay with the President and Prime Minister, and
the execution of the enforcing directives was a responsibility of a
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