“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
F U N D A M E N T A L B A S E S O F S T R A T E G Y
last ARCADIA session on the 14th was submitted to the President
and Prime Mini~ter.~’Although the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft of 24
January and adopted on 10 February.73 This final version formed, as
it were, the constitutional framework for the combined direction of
the war; and in view of the remarkable success of Anglo-American
collaboration, it may be considered as one of the most significant
documents in the long history of military alliances.
T h e most important element in the new machinery was the Com-
bined Chiefs of Staff (CCS). Actually, that body had existed at
ARCADIA; what was new was the designation and the provision for
continuous rather than periodic sessions. In choosing the title, Amer-
ican rather than British usage was followed: the term “combined”
was officially defined as connoting collaboration between two or more
of the United Nations, “joint” as connoting collaboration between
two or more services of a single nation. This provided a more precise
designation than had existed before, though in respect to the sub-
sidiary agencies it reversed rather than confirmed earlier practice; thus
the group which had been commonly referred to as the Joint Plan-
ning Committee now became the Combined Planning Staff (CPS).
T h e Combined Chiefs of Staff was to sit normally in Washington,
with regularly scheduled meetings. It was to consist of the United
States chiefs of staff and the British chiefs of staff or, in their absence
from Washington, of their duly appointed representatives. For the
British this meant dual representation. Their members of the CCS
were Adm. Sir Dudley Pound, Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, and Air Chief
Marshal Sir Charles Portal, representing the three services, and Field
Marshal Sir John Dill representing Mr. Churchill as Minister of De-
fense. Sir John Dill was to remain in Washington after the departure
of his three colleagues, and with him were to act, vice those members,
the British Joint Staff Mission-Adm. Sir Charles Little, Gen. Sir Col-
ville Wemyss, and Air Marshal Arthur T. Harris. T h e United States
members consisted of Adm. Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Opera-
tions; Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; Gen.
George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, U. S. AEmy; and Lt. Gen. H. H.
Arnold, Chief, AAF and Deputy Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.
T h e use of the existing British Chiefs of Staff Committee as a model
for the new organization raised two awkward questions. In the British
system, the R A F enjoyed the same status as the older services, with
253