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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

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“United Press”36 pages

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
F U N D A M E N T A L B A S E S O F S T R A T E G Y
air force which could absorb in 1943 the tremendous flow of aircraft
and aircrews. Just ten days after the 115-group program was au-
thorized, the Chief of the Air Staff presented General Arnold with
a plan for AAF expansion in 1943, recommending an increase of 109
combat groups.65 By 5 February this 2 24-group program had been
accepted in the AAF as a basis for further study.G6The program was
not formally approved until July, by which time several changes had
occurred in the allocation of groups among the several combat types,
and by September 1942 this schedule had in turn been supplanted by
the 273-group program. But inasmuch as long-range allocation and
deployment plans for some months after ARCADIA were based on
anticipated forces of I I 5 groups by 3 I December 1942 and of 2 2 4
groups a year later, it is convenient to summarize here the unit status
at the several pertinent dates.G’ Groups
Aircraft per G r o u p Author- To be
Aviation mented H a n d , 19 19 Jan. Group Increase b y 3 1 Dec.
T y p e of Group Strength Strength Jan. 1942 1 9 4 2 Progrum 1 9 4 3 r 9 4 3
1st Aiig- Groups on ized 115- Proposed Attained
Heavy Bombardment 35 5s ‘4 2 0 34 3 2 66
Medium Bombardment 57 69 9 5 I 2 6 18
Light Bombardment 57 57 5 3 10 2 0 30
Pursuit 80 10s 26 7 3’ 2 7 58
Transport 35 55 6 6 I 2 I 2 24
TOTALS 70 45 1 1 5 109 224
2 8
-4 16 I 2
- - -lo
5 5 57 -Observation
Permanent Machinery for Militlmy Control
O n I January I 942, twenty-six nations through representatives
assembled in Washington pledged their mutual co-operation against
the Tripartite powers to the extent of their respective military and
economic resources.68 In manpower and industrial capacity, if not in
current military strength, the United Nations were vastly superior
to the Axis powers. But whatever public statements might be made
about common ideals, the twenty-six members of the new organiza-
tion had separate national interests, sometimes widely divergent or
even conflicting; material advantages might easily be dissipated by the
lack of unity usually inherent in a military coalition. In his address to
the Congress on 6 January, President Roosevelt promised that “we
shall not fight isolated wars-each nation going its own way.” H e
referred to measures already taken to insure cohesive efforts-current
military discussions and the unified command in the Southwest Pacific-
and said: “There will be a continuation of conferences and consul-
2S I

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