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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 125 …an invading army. For that job they were well equipped, trained, and organized. Though the Luftwaff…
  • p. 127 …For the first time, German parachute troops were successfully employed when the Nazi forces invaded Holland…
  • p. 131 …equipment for moving an invading force across the intervening waters. The army itself, caught unprepared, required…
  • p. 134 …By the first of June the British had been forced to yield Crete to the invaders…
  • p. 183 …Nevertheless, a land army should be prepared to invade the continent and Germany itself. T h…
  • p. 246 …this effort." Apparently the course of the invaders plotted earlier in the morning was not utilized…
  • p. 263 …tanks, but they too “strafed and restrafed the invaders.” As Lt. Samuel H. Marrett, squadron commander…
  • p. 461 …the invading forces was merely preliminary to the bringing in of bombers in preparation for the…
  • p. 493 …Its nickel and chrome mines were readily accessible to an invader. Admiral King believed that the…
  • p. 522 …after the action; not until the war ended and the teams of interrogators invaded Japan was…
  • p. 529 …There was no intention of invading the Alaskan mainland, or even Dutch Harbor; the objective was…
  • p. 535 …Four of the most efficient carriers had gone down, carrying with them the hopes of Admiral…
  • p. 559 …the latter presented the more immediate need for reinforcement. Tavoy had fallen to Japanese invaders as…
  • p. 630 …The Netherlands East Indies and Burma, already invaded, were doomed. T h e Indian Ocean was…
  • p. 633 …to the preliminary strategic bombardment and only modestly to direct support of the invading force. A…
F U N D A M E N T A L B A S E S O F S T R A T E G Y
air force which could absorb in 1943 the tremendous flow of aircraft
and aircrews. Just ten days after the 115-group program was au-
thorized, the Chief of the Air Staff presented General Arnold with
a plan for AAF expansion in 1943, recommending an increase of 109
combat groups.65 By 5 February this 2 24-group program had been
accepted in the AAF as a basis for further study.G6The program was
not formally approved until July, by which time several changes had
occurred in the allocation of groups among the several combat types,
and by September 1942 this schedule had in turn been supplanted by
the 273-group program. But inasmuch as long-range allocation and
deployment plans for some months after ARCADIA were based on
anticipated forces of I I 5 groups by 3 I December 1942 and of 2 2 4
groups a year later, it is convenient to summarize here the unit status
at the several pertinent dates.G’ Groups
Aircraft per G r o u p Author- To be
Aviation mented H a n d , 19 19 Jan. Group Increase b y 3 1 Dec.
T y p e of Group Strength Strength Jan. 1942 1 9 4 2 Progrum 1 9 4 3 r 9 4 3
1st Aiig- Groups on ized 115- Proposed Attained
Heavy Bombardment 35 5s ‘4 2 0 34 3 2 66
Medium Bombardment 57 69 9 5 I 2 6 18
Light Bombardment 57 57 5 3 10 2 0 30
Pursuit 80 10s 26 7 3’ 2 7 58
Transport 35 55 6 6 I 2 I 2 24
TOTALS 70 45 1 1 5 109 224
2 8
-4 16 I 2
- - -lo
5 5 57 -Observation
Permanent Machinery for Militlmy Control
O n I January I 942, twenty-six nations through representatives
assembled in Washington pledged their mutual co-operation against
the Tripartite powers to the extent of their respective military and
economic resources.68 In manpower and industrial capacity, if not in
current military strength, the United Nations were vastly superior
to the Axis powers. But whatever public statements might be made
about common ideals, the twenty-six members of the new organiza-
tion had separate national interests, sometimes widely divergent or
even conflicting; material advantages might easily be dissipated by the
lack of unity usually inherent in a military coalition. In his address to
the Congress on 6 January, President Roosevelt promised that “we
shall not fight isolated wars-each nation going its own way.” H e
referred to measures already taken to insure cohesive efforts-current
military discussions and the unified command in the Southwest Pacific-
and said: “There will be a continuation of conferences and consul-
2S I

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.