Documents / Document

The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 125 …an invading army. For that job they were well equipped, trained, and organized. Though the Luftwaff…
  • p. 127 …For the first time, German parachute troops were successfully employed when the Nazi forces invaded Holland…
  • p. 131 …equipment for moving an invading force across the intervening waters. The army itself, caught unprepared, required…
  • p. 134 …By the first of June the British had been forced to yield Crete to the invaders…
  • p. 183 …Nevertheless, a land army should be prepared to invade the continent and Germany itself. T h…
  • p. 246 …this effort." Apparently the course of the invaders plotted earlier in the morning was not utilized…
  • p. 263 …tanks, but they too “strafed and restrafed the invaders.” As Lt. Samuel H. Marrett, squadron commander…
  • p. 461 …the invading forces was merely preliminary to the bringing in of bombers in preparation for the…
  • p. 493 …Its nickel and chrome mines were readily accessible to an invader. Admiral King believed that the…
  • p. 522 …after the action; not until the war ended and the teams of interrogators invaded Japan was…
  • p. 529 …There was no intention of invading the Alaskan mainland, or even Dutch Harbor; the objective was…
  • p. 535 …Four of the most efficient carriers had gone down, carrying with them the hopes of Admiral…
  • p. 559 …the latter presented the more immediate need for reinforcement. Tavoy had fallen to Japanese invaders as…
  • p. 630 …The Netherlands East Indies and Burma, already invaded, were doomed. T h e Indian Ocean was…
  • p. 633 …to the preliminary strategic bombardment and only modestly to direct support of the invading force. A…
F U N D A M E N T A L B A S E S O F S T R A T E G Y
to be subject to periodic readjustments when changes in attrition rates,
in production estimates, or in planned deployments warranted recon-
sideration. T h e rigidity of this schedule appeared to some allocations
experts sufficient to make the scheme impractical in the light of so
many variable but the readjustment feature was to be its
saving grace. When in February 1942 the combined Munitions As-
signments Board was established,” the Arnold-Portal Agreement was
accepted “for production planning purposes,” 5 6 and it served as a
point of departure for later revisions. This agreement, it must be noted,
was only bilateral. Existing commitments by each of the signators to
other powers were still in force. For the United States the most im-
portant of these was the Soviet protocol, which remained the guide
for deliveries to the U.S.S.R. until replaced by the Washington pro-
tocol in autumn 1942.~’
T h e increase in the number of aircraft scheduled for delivery to the
AAF under the Victory Program called for a parallel expansion of the
whole air organization. This meant an increase in the total troop basis,
in the training program, and in the number of organized units. When
war came, the AAF had an authorized strength of 348,535 officers and
men.58 Its training establishment was geared to an annual rate of
37,000 pilots and I 10,000 technicians. This training schedule reflected
the needs of the &-group program, which had been publicly an-
nounced on 2 3 October but accomplishment of which had been ef-
fectively blocked by the shortage of combat planes. Of the 84 groups
authorized, 70 had been activated, but in many cases little had been
done beyond formal a~tivation.~’Relatively few of the groups were
a t table-of-organization strength in men, and few were fully equipped
with modern aircraft. T h e Air Staff was faced with the problem of
devising an orderly schedule which would provide aircrews and or-
H.B. M.B. L.B. Pursuit Observation Transport
Sept. 43 2 0 0 249 400 I 0 0 48
73 2 00 257 400 I 0 0 46
92 I 0 0 281 3 50 94 38
I 49
589 ‘744 2745 4050 402 852
-
Oct.
Nov.
Dee. __ - -400-182
__
1 1 1 I 0 0
-
The above allocation will be subject to readjustment a t a later date when attrition
rates, changes in production figures or changes in number of units in combat areas
make it advisable.
The assignment of models to conform to the allocation listed above as attached
hereto is also agreed upon.
The allocation of trainers will be dealt with separately.
See below, pp. 256-57.
249

About this file

Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.