“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
F U N D A M E N T A L B A S E S O F S T R A T E G Y
to be subject to periodic readjustments when changes in attrition rates,
in production estimates, or in planned deployments warranted recon-
sideration. T h e rigidity of this schedule appeared to some allocations
experts sufficient to make the scheme impractical in the light of so
many variable but the readjustment feature was to be its
saving grace. When in February 1942 the combined Munitions As-
signments Board was established,” the Arnold-Portal Agreement was
accepted “for production planning purposes,” 5 6 and it served as a
point of departure for later revisions. This agreement, it must be noted,
was only bilateral. Existing commitments by each of the signators to
other powers were still in force. For the United States the most im-
portant of these was the Soviet protocol, which remained the guide
for deliveries to the U.S.S.R. until replaced by the Washington pro-
tocol in autumn 1942.~’
T h e increase in the number of aircraft scheduled for delivery to the
AAF under the Victory Program called for a parallel expansion of the
whole air organization. This meant an increase in the total troop basis,
in the training program, and in the number of organized units. When
war came, the AAF had an authorized strength of 348,535 officers and
men.58 Its training establishment was geared to an annual rate of
37,000 pilots and I 10,000 technicians. This training schedule reflected
the needs of the &-group program, which had been publicly an-
nounced on 2 3 October but accomplishment of which had been ef-
fectively blocked by the shortage of combat planes. Of the 84 groups
authorized, 70 had been activated, but in many cases little had been
done beyond formal a~tivation.~’Relatively few of the groups were
a t table-of-organization strength in men, and few were fully equipped
with modern aircraft. T h e Air Staff was faced with the problem of
devising an orderly schedule which would provide aircrews and or-
H.B. M.B. L.B. Pursuit Observation Transport
Sept. 43 2 0 0 249 400 I 0 0 48
73 2 00 257 400 I 0 0 46
92 I 0 0 281 3 50 94 38
I 49
589 ‘744 2745 4050 402 852
-
Oct.
Nov.
Dee. __ - -400-182
__
1 1 1 I 0 0
-
The above allocation will be subject to readjustment a t a later date when attrition
rates, changes in production figures or changes in number of units in combat areas
make it advisable.
The assignment of models to conform to the allocation listed above as attached
hereto is also agreed upon.
The allocation of trainers will be dealt with separately.
See below, pp. 256-57.
249