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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to “sweep the Germans from the sky…
  • p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with the ambitious idens of air power which…
  • p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was never equipped during…
  • p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are you in the Army or the Corps…
  • p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
  • p. 69 …But one axiom, with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never- theless left an open question as to how…
  • p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300 aircraft a month. The pattern of…
  • p. 122 …the German Air Force, the Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in the…
  • p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French factories, the force had never been employed in a…
  • p. 140 …into a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands of our own forces…
  • p. 150 …Long-term needs of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities never…
  • p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
  • p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
  • p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never- theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
  • p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
  • p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points have never been satisfactorily explained. T h e general pattern…
  • p. 277 …motors, sole- noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit- less search…
  • p. 288 …planners and from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate. The translation of the accepted grand…
  • p. 303 …the principal features of the plan were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
  • p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
  • p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
  • p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
  • p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
  • p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
  • p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
  • p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been accomplished, yet now it…
  • p. 509 …Island, in the Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May the two…
  • p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the aircrews, for on the operational level…
  • p. 524 …handicaps under which AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
  • p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that proper observance of economy of force would never…
  • p. 531 …Crews which had previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these weapons into…
  • p. 544 …But the Japanese never at any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
  • p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into All told, the record…
  • p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com- mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
  • p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
  • p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
  • p. 614 …that reason deserving a high priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
  • p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign- ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
  • p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
  • p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England, nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
  • p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never before equaled by the military forces of two…
  • p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
F U N D A M E N T A L B A S E S O F S T R A T E G Y
precedence to heavy bombers for defense in this hemisphere and in
the Pacific; and in the air assault on Germany, precedence over equip-
ment for air support of a large ground force. T h e design for expansion
suggested in AWPD/ I was not incompatible with those suggestions,
and the air requirements of that plan, as revised in London in Sep-
tember, were adopted as the general guide for production.
O n 3 January President Roosevelt sent Mr. Stimson a list of muni-
tions, with a directive that he achieve the schedules contained therein
and consult with the Secretary of the Navy as to allocation between
the using services. No relative priorities were suggested. Aircraft goals
were as
Aircraft T y p e s
Target
Monthly
1942 I 943 Production
Long-range, heavy, and medium bombers I 1 , 3 0 0 3O@Q 3 P J O
Light, dive, and scout bombers I 1,000 I 7,000 2 , 0 0 0
Observation and transports -6,700 I 5,000 1 ,500
Pursuits 16,000 38,000 3,500
Total combat 45,000 100,ooo IO,OOO
I 5,000 3 1,000
G R A N D T O T A L S 60,000 I 3 I ,000
For 1942,this meant increasing existing schedules from about 46,000
to 60,000. T h e figures for 1943 differed slightly from those sent to
Congress by the President on 6 January, which called for 25,000 rather
than 31,000 trainer^.'^ In either case they seemed prodigious, espe-
cially in view of equally impressive requirements for ground and naval
warfare. With any reasonably calculated rate of wastage, the annual
production schedules of 60,000 and I 3 1,000 aircraft should easily
meet the requirements agreed on a t London-about 60,000 combat and
37,000 training planes for the AAF and 21,000 for the U.S. Navy,
plus the British deficit of 13,553.
At the suggestion of the AAF, the following schedule of allocations
of combat planes was agreed on by the U.S. services, and approved by
the President on 14 January:”
__
-Trainers
1942 1943
Aircraft T y p e s A r m y N a v y Total Army N a v y Total
Long-range, heavy, and medium
bombers 9,780 1 , 5 2 0 11,300 26,190 3,810 30,000
Light, dive, torpedo, and scout
bombers 7 , 2 7 0 3,730 11,000 9,160 7,840 17,000
Pursuits 14,350 1,650 16,000 30,600 7,400 38,000
3,430 3 , 3 2 0 6,750 12,260 2,740 15,000_ _ _ _ _Observation and transports
T O T A L S 34,830 10,220 45,050 78,210 21,790 100,000
247

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.