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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 14 …with the commanding general, who in some instances moved in advance of promptings from Wash- ington…
  • p. 25 …EASTERNAND WESTERNAPPROACHESTO PANAMACANAL ALASKAAND THE ALEUTIANISLANDS PRINCIPALSEAAND AIR ROUTESAS DESIGNATEDBY WASH- ATLANTICFERRYINGAND TRANSPORTROUTESPRIORTO . . . . . . . . . . 297 30' 305…
  • p. 229 …the importance of the Far East Air Force in American strategy, the Air Staff in Wash…
  • p. 292 …Even so, there was in Wash- ington too little intelligence concerning the fluid tactical situation to…
  • p. 302 …The suggestion had been carried out in 1941 with the establishment of the U.S. Special…
  • p. 306 …work permanently with the British Joint Intelligence Committee in Wash- ington. The Combined Military Transportation Committee…
  • p. 389 …to delay the take-off was granted only after an appeal to Wash- ington.’O 3…
  • p. 442 …the time and attention of U.S. officers at Brisbane and of headquarters in Wash- ington…
  • p. 443 …Accidents delayed three planes en route, and one of the P-40’s was completely “washed…
  • p. 454 …promise of weakening the enemy. Attention already had been given in Wash- ington to establishment of…
  • p. 554 …In China, he found the procurement of necessary equipment, even be- fore the outbreak of war…
  • p. 636 …After further negotiations in Wash- ington, the Arnold-Towers-Portal agreement was adopted on z I…
  • p. 693 …Accordingly, Wash- ington was requested to send immediately 50 intelligence officers for training by the RAF…
  • p. 747 …before the Committee on Military Af- fairs, House of Representatives (Wash- 23. See, for instance, William…
  • p. 772 …The exact date of the arrival of air units is not known, as the latter source…
  • p. 799 …The road from Haiphong, Indo- China, to Yunnan was closed by the Vichy government in 1940…
  • p. 814 …Overseas (Ferrying), Air Min- istry, Memorandum on the Movement by Air of US. Forces to the…
F U N D A M E N T A L B A S E S O F S T R A T E G Y
by the slow water route. T h e need was so desperate that on I Z
January the US. chiefs of staff suggested a review of the shipping
priorities just established for the By reducing the size of
convoys designed for Iceland and Northern Ireland and by reassign-
ing the bottoms thus released, it was possible to find troop space for
z 1,800 men, including ground forces for N e w Caledonia and AAF per-
sonnel for the Far East area, and shipping space for the aircraft. This
plan was adopted; 38 it retarded troop movements in the Atlantic and
the shipment of lend-lease supplies to Russia, but it provided mini-
mum forces for immediate defense against Japan.
Even after reinforcements for the Far East had been allocated and
shipping priorities established, it would be a matter of weeks before
they could be brought to bear against the enemy. In the meanwhile,
the Allied cause could be strengthened by a more effective utilization
of the forces already in the theater. T h e comrnand structure which
had been prescribed in ABC-I provided little more than a loose col-
laboration of American, British, Australian, N e w Zealand, and Neth-
erlands forces dispersed throughout an area of millions of square
miles. In the face of the numerical superiority of the enemy's forces
and of the effective synchronization of his operations in widely sepa-
rated regions, it was imperative that the United Nations improve
their system of control. General Marshall on 25 December pointed
out the weakness of the current command structure and proposed
the establishment of a single unified command for the Far East area.39
There were objections of a practical sort which could be urged against
any system which vested in one leader full control over the several
arms of five nations, but the alternatives were so unpromising that
Marshall's proposal was a c ~ e p t e d . ~ 'Because of the predominant Brit-
ish Commonwealth interests involved, the United States accepted as
supreme Allied commander Gen. Sir Archibald P. Wavell, whose
appointment was announced on 3 January.41 His deputy commander
and staff were chosen to give widest representation to air, ground,
and naval forces of the interested nations. T h e directive under which
Wavell was to exercise his powers was approved b y the President
and Prime Minister on 10 J a n ~ a r y . ~ 'This document prescribed the
relations which were to be maintained between the supreme Allied
commander, the Anglo-American chiefs of staff, and the ABDA
governments." Its specific provisions were not always to pass unchal-
* American-British-Dutch-Australian.
2 4 3

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.