“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
F U N D A M E N T A L B A S E S O F S T R A T E G Y
by the slow water route. T h e need was so desperate that on I Z
January the US. chiefs of staff suggested a review of the shipping
priorities just established for the By reducing the size of
convoys designed for Iceland and Northern Ireland and by reassign-
ing the bottoms thus released, it was possible to find troop space for
z 1,800 men, including ground forces for N e w Caledonia and AAF per-
sonnel for the Far East area, and shipping space for the aircraft. This
plan was adopted; 38 it retarded troop movements in the Atlantic and
the shipment of lend-lease supplies to Russia, but it provided mini-
mum forces for immediate defense against Japan.
Even after reinforcements for the Far East had been allocated and
shipping priorities established, it would be a matter of weeks before
they could be brought to bear against the enemy. In the meanwhile,
the Allied cause could be strengthened by a more effective utilization
of the forces already in the theater. T h e comrnand structure which
had been prescribed in ABC-I provided little more than a loose col-
laboration of American, British, Australian, N e w Zealand, and Neth-
erlands forces dispersed throughout an area of millions of square
miles. In the face of the numerical superiority of the enemy's forces
and of the effective synchronization of his operations in widely sepa-
rated regions, it was imperative that the United Nations improve
their system of control. General Marshall on 25 December pointed
out the weakness of the current command structure and proposed
the establishment of a single unified command for the Far East area.39
There were objections of a practical sort which could be urged against
any system which vested in one leader full control over the several
arms of five nations, but the alternatives were so unpromising that
Marshall's proposal was a c ~ e p t e d . ~ 'Because of the predominant Brit-
ish Commonwealth interests involved, the United States accepted as
supreme Allied commander Gen. Sir Archibald P. Wavell, whose
appointment was announced on 3 January.41 His deputy commander
and staff were chosen to give widest representation to air, ground,
and naval forces of the interested nations. T h e directive under which
Wavell was to exercise his powers was approved b y the President
and Prime Minister on 10 J a n ~ a r y . ~ 'This document prescribed the
relations which were to be maintained between the supreme Allied
commander, the Anglo-American chiefs of staff, and the ABDA
governments." Its specific provisions were not always to pass unchal-
* American-British-Dutch-Australian.
2 4 3