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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 303 …of Naval Opera- tions; Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; Gen. George…
  • p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you know, is not only Chief…
  • p. 493 …Admiral King believed that the mines offered a tempting bait to the Japanese who were currently…
  • p. 526 …Hence Admiral King placed a bid for suffi- 461
  • p. 527 …t this stage of the war Admiral King had accepted the belief that his carrier planes…
  • p. 538 …plan by 2 9 June, when Admiral King submitted to the Joint Chiefs a proposal that…
  • p. 607 …type * O n 5 March 1942, Admiral King wrote to General Arnold as follows: “The experience…
  • p. 608 …s.’l A formal request by Admiral King to the Chief of the Army Air Forces…
  • p. 609 …In a letter of 9 March 1942 to Admiral King, he proposed “the estab- lishment of…
  • p. 614 …In June, Admiral King expressed the official Navy position on this point with the utmost clarity…
  • p. 615 …In a memorandum to Admiral King, General McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, on 26 May outlined…
  • p. 616 …viewed as a temporary deta~hment.?~ Admiral King’s reaction to these cautious proposals was expressed…
  • p. 618 …the same words as used by Admiral King a month earlier: the answer to the antisubmarine…
  • p. 621 …On 14 September, General Marshall wrote to Admiral King: “Experience with the First Bomber Command in…
  • p. 622 …T o General Marshall’s proposal of 14 September, Admiral King had replied that, although he…
  • p. 641 …54 A week later General Marshall, Admiral King, Harry Hopkins, and a small staff flew to…
  • p. 645 …that scheduled to operate from the United King- dom. Dry topic or no, organization must figure…
  • p. 684 …the principal air task in the United King- dom had long been conceived as strategic bombardment…
  • p. 707 …establishment of base depots in the United King- dom became the basis of action in January…
  • p. 724 …Implicit in all of the arrangements being made in the United King- dom was the belief…
  • p. 788 …Force, Pt. I ; Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King, First Official Report to the Secretary of the…
  • p. 793 …Memo for Adm, King from C/S, 17 Mar. 1 % ~ . 34. JPS 2I/j/D, 7…
  • p. 795 …4 Aug. 1942. 108. Zbid. 109. Adm. King’s Report on Battle of Midway, incl. in…
  • p. 797 …306, 29 June 1942; memos for Adm. King from Mar- shall, 26 June 1942, and for…
  • p. 802 …1942; CM-IN-0629, Chung- king to AGWAR, # # z , 3 Apr. 1942; memo for Gen. Arnold…
  • p. 805 …Ltr., Arnold to King, 2 5 Feb. 1942. certain evidence from all Allied and enemy sources…
  • p. 806 …Memo for King from McNarney, 26 May 1942. 7 1 . Ltr., King to Marshall, 10 June…
  • p. 807 …Ltr., Marshall to King, 14 Sept. 1942, TAB XIVA, in Bowles report; memo for C G…
  • p. 808 …to notes from Mar- shall and Adm. King). 3 2 . A I c m o for…
  • p. 814 …Forces to the United King- dom, App. A, 19 Aug. 1942. 50. Ltr., Col. H.L…
  • p. 851 …C.E., 48-50 Killin, Pfc, 219 Kilner Board, 1 2 0 Kimbolton, 63 I King…
  • p. 854 …in Chief, 515, 5 2 2 , 544. (see also King); controversy over air power vs. battleship…
F U N D A M E N T A L B A S E S O F S T R A T E G Y
by the slow water route. T h e need was so desperate that on I Z
January the US. chiefs of staff suggested a review of the shipping
priorities just established for the By reducing the size of
convoys designed for Iceland and Northern Ireland and by reassign-
ing the bottoms thus released, it was possible to find troop space for
z 1,800 men, including ground forces for N e w Caledonia and AAF per-
sonnel for the Far East area, and shipping space for the aircraft. This
plan was adopted; 38 it retarded troop movements in the Atlantic and
the shipment of lend-lease supplies to Russia, but it provided mini-
mum forces for immediate defense against Japan.
Even after reinforcements for the Far East had been allocated and
shipping priorities established, it would be a matter of weeks before
they could be brought to bear against the enemy. In the meanwhile,
the Allied cause could be strengthened by a more effective utilization
of the forces already in the theater. T h e comrnand structure which
had been prescribed in ABC-I provided little more than a loose col-
laboration of American, British, Australian, N e w Zealand, and Neth-
erlands forces dispersed throughout an area of millions of square
miles. In the face of the numerical superiority of the enemy's forces
and of the effective synchronization of his operations in widely sepa-
rated regions, it was imperative that the United Nations improve
their system of control. General Marshall on 25 December pointed
out the weakness of the current command structure and proposed
the establishment of a single unified command for the Far East area.39
There were objections of a practical sort which could be urged against
any system which vested in one leader full control over the several
arms of five nations, but the alternatives were so unpromising that
Marshall's proposal was a c ~ e p t e d . ~ 'Because of the predominant Brit-
ish Commonwealth interests involved, the United States accepted as
supreme Allied commander Gen. Sir Archibald P. Wavell, whose
appointment was announced on 3 January.41 His deputy commander
and staff were chosen to give widest representation to air, ground,
and naval forces of the interested nations. T h e directive under which
Wavell was to exercise his powers was approved b y the President
and Prime Minister on 10 J a n ~ a r y . ~ 'This document prescribed the
relations which were to be maintained between the supreme Allied
commander, the Anglo-American chiefs of staff, and the ABDA
governments." Its specific provisions were not always to pass unchal-
* American-British-Dutch-Australian.
2 4 3

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.