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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
  • p. 226 …Air Service Command under Col. L.S. Churchill. Because of a shortage of experienced officers, only…
  • p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
  • p. 287 …the arrival in Washington of Prime Minister Churchill, his chiefs of staff, and other high-ranking…
  • p. 290 …stipulated in ABC-I. A t Mr. Churchill’s request, U.S. troops were to relieve…
  • p. 302 …the U.S. forces, and by Mr. Churchill as British Prime Minister and Minister of Defense…
  • p. 303 …Field Marshal Sir John Dill representing Mr. Churchill as Minister of De- fense. Sir John Dill…
  • p. 304 …of such a personal representative of Mr. Churchill might make difficult the maintenance of normal military…
  • p. 425 …O n the same day, Prime Minister Churchill informed Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell of his selection…
  • p. 628 …Western Hemisphere. When the President and Mr. Churchill met with their military staffs in the ARCADIA…
  • p. 630 …strong support in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered on 5 March, in which…
  • p. 636 …first in a gen- eral meeting with Churchill, later among the airmen alone.34Arnold reviewed the…
  • p. 639 …Much had happened in the two months which had passed since Churchill had approved that plan…
  • p. 640 …Duncan, chief of staff for the Eighth Air Force, wrote from Washington to Spaatz that Churchill…
  • p. 641 …postponement was al- most tantamount to refusal. Churchill was back in London by the 27th. In…
  • p. 642 …then back in Washington, that Roosevelt and Churchill “believed” that T O R C H was…
  • p. 661 …Even during the Battle of Britain, Churchill could tell the House of Commons that “there seems…
  • p. 705 …4 1 . ~ ~The following month, Prime Minister Churchill in conference with Messrs. Harry Hopkins and Averell…
  • p. 810 …2 0 August 1940, in R.S. Churchill, ed., Into Battle (London, 1941),p. 2 5…
  • p. 811 …comp., Winston Churchill’s Secret Session Speeches (New York, 1946), p. 85. 161. Larner report, as…
  • p. 845 …L.S., 182 Churchill, Prime Minister Winston, 133, 1369 141, 232, 235-37, 2409 2431 252…
F U N D A M E N T A L B A S E S O F S T R A T E G Y
by the slow water route. T h e need was so desperate that on I Z
January the US. chiefs of staff suggested a review of the shipping
priorities just established for the By reducing the size of
convoys designed for Iceland and Northern Ireland and by reassign-
ing the bottoms thus released, it was possible to find troop space for
z 1,800 men, including ground forces for N e w Caledonia and AAF per-
sonnel for the Far East area, and shipping space for the aircraft. This
plan was adopted; 38 it retarded troop movements in the Atlantic and
the shipment of lend-lease supplies to Russia, but it provided mini-
mum forces for immediate defense against Japan.
Even after reinforcements for the Far East had been allocated and
shipping priorities established, it would be a matter of weeks before
they could be brought to bear against the enemy. In the meanwhile,
the Allied cause could be strengthened by a more effective utilization
of the forces already in the theater. T h e comrnand structure which
had been prescribed in ABC-I provided little more than a loose col-
laboration of American, British, Australian, N e w Zealand, and Neth-
erlands forces dispersed throughout an area of millions of square
miles. In the face of the numerical superiority of the enemy's forces
and of the effective synchronization of his operations in widely sepa-
rated regions, it was imperative that the United Nations improve
their system of control. General Marshall on 25 December pointed
out the weakness of the current command structure and proposed
the establishment of a single unified command for the Far East area.39
There were objections of a practical sort which could be urged against
any system which vested in one leader full control over the several
arms of five nations, but the alternatives were so unpromising that
Marshall's proposal was a c ~ e p t e d . ~ 'Because of the predominant Brit-
ish Commonwealth interests involved, the United States accepted as
supreme Allied commander Gen. Sir Archibald P. Wavell, whose
appointment was announced on 3 January.41 His deputy commander
and staff were chosen to give widest representation to air, ground,
and naval forces of the interested nations. T h e directive under which
Wavell was to exercise his powers was approved b y the President
and Prime Minister on 10 J a n ~ a r y . ~ 'This document prescribed the
relations which were to be maintained between the supreme Allied
commander, the Anglo-American chiefs of staff, and the ABDA
governments." Its specific provisions were not always to pass unchal-
* American-British-Dutch-Australian.
2 4 3

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.