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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Fuller”7 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1 additional arrangements had to be made to protect lines of communi- cation from those countries and within the theater. The task of providing reinforcements in combat units and addi- tional supplies was not a simple one. In electing to concentrate Anglo- American efforts first against the Nazis, the chiefs of staff had accepted the corollary that “only the minimum of forces necessary for the safeguarding of vital interests in other theaters should be diverted from Germany.” 3 2 The pitiful inadequacy of Allied strength in the Far East made imperative, even under these restrictions, the immediate dispatch thither of such minimum forces. Even so, there was in Wash- ington too little intelligence concerning the fluid tactical situation to justify firm commitments. The disposition of additional forces must hinge upon a number of contingencies-particularly upon the situation in Luzon, Singapore, and the Netherlands East Indies at such time as the reinforcements should arrive.33 Among the U.S. chiefs of staff there was a natural desire-prompted by humanitarian, strategic, and political considerations-to send aid to MacArthur’s beleaguered army. In the course of the ARCADIA conversations, however, it became apparent that such assistance could not be sent directly to the Philippines. The exact day of that decision is difficult to determine, but before the conference closed it was accepted that the only hope was to channel reinforcements up through Australia, and that hope grew progressively dimmer.” 3 4 In the absence of naval supremacy, there was little utility in planting ground force garrisons in the Malay barrier in spots which the enemy might easily by-pass. The string of island bases which constituted the vital but tenuous air link between Hawaii and Australia did require troops for local de- fense. New Zealand was assigned responsibility for Fiji, and Australia for the ultimate protection of New Caledonia; but it was necessary for the United States to provide a large ground force immediately for the latter island.35Otherwise the prime necessity was for an early and substantial increase in air power-for local defense of the islands and for a striking force farther west. The AAF had-en route, at U.S. ports of embarkation, or earmarked for early dispatch to the Far East-a number of air units and about 400 planes.36Actually the chief difficulty lay in the shortage of shipping rather than of aircraft or crews; for, whereas heavy bombers could be ferried out, lighter planes and their crews, ground personnel, and supplies must proceed * See above, pp. 232-33. 242
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