The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
additional arrangements had to be made to protect lines of communi-
cation from those countries and within the theater.
The task of providing reinforcements in combat units and addi-
tional supplies was not a simple one. In electing to concentrate Anglo-
American efforts first against the Nazis, the chiefs of staff had
accepted the corollary that “only the minimum of forces necessary for
the safeguarding of vital interests in other theaters should be diverted
from Germany.” 3 2 The pitiful inadequacy of Allied strength in the
Far East made imperative, even under these restrictions, the immediate
dispatch thither of such minimum forces. Even so, there was in Wash-
ington too little intelligence concerning the fluid tactical situation
to justify firm commitments. The disposition of additional forces
must hinge upon a number of contingencies-particularly upon the
situation in Luzon, Singapore, and the Netherlands East Indies at
such time as the reinforcements should arrive.33 Among the U.S.
chiefs of staff there was a natural desire-prompted by humanitarian,
strategic, and political considerations-to send aid to MacArthur’s
beleaguered army. In the course of the ARCADIA conversations,
however, it became apparent that such assistance could not be sent
directly to the Philippines. The exact day of that decision is difficult
to determine, but before the conference closed it was accepted that
the only hope was to channel reinforcements up through Australia,
and that hope grew progressively dimmer.” 3 4 In the absence of naval
supremacy, there was little utility in planting ground force garrisons
in the Malay barrier in spots which the enemy might easily by-pass.
The string of island bases which constituted the vital but tenuous air
link between Hawaii and Australia did require troops for local de-
fense. New Zealand was assigned responsibility for Fiji, and Australia
for the ultimate protection of New Caledonia; but it was necessary
for the United States to provide a large ground force immediately
for the latter island.35Otherwise the prime necessity was for an early
and substantial increase in air power-for local defense of the islands
and for a striking force farther west. The AAF had-en route, at
U.S. ports of embarkation, or earmarked for early dispatch to the
Far East-a number of air units and about 400 planes.36Actually the
chief difficulty lay in the shortage of shipping rather than of aircraft
or crews; for, whereas heavy bombers could be ferried out, lighter
planes and their crews, ground personnel, and supplies must proceed
* See above, pp. 232-33.
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