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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“King”32 pages
F U N D A M E N T A L B A S E S O F S T R A T E G Y effort required in terms of forces and shipping, no firm decision had been reached when the ARCADIA conference closed. Active plan- ning for the operation continued throughout January and February." T h e plan was shelved on 3 only to be revived in the summer in preparation for the invasion of November 1942. Insofar as the Atlantic-European theaters were concerned, then, the Japanese attacks had done little to modify the strategic ideas of spring 1941,either in respect to over-all priorities or to specific de- ployments. In the Pacific the situation had been altered radically by the events of December; and, if the Anglo-American strategists were unwilling to forsake their basic concepts for the war against Japan, they had to re-examine the means by which those concepts might be put to test. Discussion by the Anglo-American chiefs of staff centered around three fundamental problems: a reconsideration of the nature of the strategic defense against Japan; the allocation of forces and shipping for that defense; and the establishment of an effective system of command over the widely scattered forces of the several United Nations. These problems were intimately related, and any ready solu- tion was complicated by the whirlwind advance of the enemy, by the poverty of our intelligence concerning his intentions and capa- bilities, and by the primitive communications system upon which the widely scattered forces were dependent. Eventual victory over Japan was contingent on the development of forward bases from which the heart of the empire could be hit. For the immediate future the best that could be hoped for was to maintain security of defensive base areas, to keep open the lines of communication, and to encourage Chinese resistance.29 Defense of the central and eastern Pacific areas devolved upon the United States alone. There seemed little likelihood of an attack in force upon the western coast of the United States,30and reinforcements were avail- able for Alaska and Hawaii. T h e most urgent requirement was for the Far East area, and on 3 1 December the Anglo-American chiefs of staff agreed on a general policy for that region3' Essentially the plan called for a defense in depth of the Malay barrier, with air and naval forces operating in advance of that line to retard the southward drive of the enemy. Australia and Burma were to serve as the sup- porting base areas. To conserve shipping, supplies were to be found locally to the extent possible, but since the great bulk of forces and munitions must be brought from the United States and from England, 24'
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