The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

F U N D A M E N T A L B A S E S O F S T R A T E G Y
effort required in terms of forces and shipping, no firm decision had
been reached when the ARCADIA conference closed. Active plan-
ning for the operation continued throughout January and February."
T h e plan was shelved on 3 only to be revived in the summer
in preparation for the invasion of November 1942.
Insofar as the Atlantic-European theaters were concerned, then,
the Japanese attacks had done little to modify the strategic ideas of
spring 1941,either in respect to over-all priorities or to specific de-
ployments. In the Pacific the situation had been altered radically by
the events of December; and, if the Anglo-American strategists were
unwilling to forsake their basic concepts for the war against Japan,
they had to re-examine the means by which those concepts might be
put to test. Discussion by the Anglo-American chiefs of staff centered
around three fundamental problems: a reconsideration of the nature
of the strategic defense against Japan; the allocation of forces and
shipping for that defense; and the establishment of an effective system
of command over the widely scattered forces of the several United
Nations. These problems were intimately related, and any ready solu-
tion was complicated by the whirlwind advance of the enemy, by
the poverty of our intelligence concerning his intentions and capa-
bilities, and by the primitive communications system upon which the
widely scattered forces were dependent.
Eventual victory over Japan was contingent on the development
of forward bases from which the heart of the empire could be hit.
For the immediate future the best that could be hoped for was to
maintain security of defensive base areas, to keep open the lines of
communication, and to encourage Chinese resistance.29 Defense of
the central and eastern Pacific areas devolved upon the United States
alone. There seemed little likelihood of an attack in force upon the
western coast of the United States,30and reinforcements were avail-
able for Alaska and Hawaii. T h e most urgent requirement was for
the Far East area, and on 3 1 December the Anglo-American chiefs
of staff agreed on a general policy for that region3' Essentially the
plan called for a defense in depth of the Malay barrier, with air and
naval forces operating in advance of that line to retard the southward
drive of the enemy. Australia and Burma were to serve as the sup-
porting base areas. To conserve shipping, supplies were to be found
locally to the extent possible, but since the great bulk of forces and
munitions must be brought from the United States and from England,
24'