“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
of March 1942.l~T h e force set up for Northern Ireland was much
greater than that stipulated in ABC-I. A t Mr. Churchill’s request,
U.S. troops were to relieve British troops then garrisoned in Northern
Ireland and were to be wholly responsible for the defense of that area
rather than merely of U.S. bases there as previously agreed. This
move, in addition to releasing British troops for service in more active
theaters, seemed politically expedient in view of Eire’s attitude toward
the war. A new plan for this project, MAGNET, was approved on
11 January.lg It called for the dispatch of the V Corps (reinforced)
plus air and supply organizations. The first sizable contingent landed
a t Belfast on 26 January,20 but because of more immediate needs in
the Pacific, the movement was thereafter retarded. The air contingent
was not scheduled for movement until late spring.
The one European task force which was designed for early offen-
sive action was the AAF bombardment force which, according to
prewar plans, was to join the RAF in the attack on Germany. This
project was approved informally at the first of the ARCADIA ses-
sions, and reaffirmed on 1 3 January.’l The movement should begin
“as soon as these forces and shipping become available.” In view of
the desperate need for aircraft and crews in the Pacific and for the
expanded training program, immediate deployment was impossible.
Current opinion that the initial heavy bomber groups might move
out in March 2 2 was to prove too optimistic.
A plan for movements within the Western Hemisphere adopted on
I 3 January 2 3 involved for the moment less shipping. It was agreed
that, subject to the consent of the Netherlands government, U.S.
troops should replace British garrisons in Aruba and Curaqao, and
that the United States should continue to hold forces in reserve for
the security of northeast Brazil against possible Axis thmsts.’*
The most ambitious project considered for the first half of 1942
was the joint occupation of French Northwest and/or North Africa.
Before Pearl Harbor, the U.S. Joint Board had worked tentatively
on plans for the seizure of Dakar (JPB BLACK) and Casablanca
(GYMNAST) to forestall any German move toward the South
Atlantic and South America.25The British meanwhile had been think-
ing of a possible landing in Tunisia, and at ARCADIA the joint
planners were directed to weld the two concepts into a single plan
(SUPER-GYMNAST) .26 In view of the many unpredictable factors
involved in so complex an operation, and in view of the scale of
240