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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Churchill”21 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1 of March 1942.l~T h e force set up for Northern Ireland was much greater than that stipulated in ABC-I. A t Mr. Churchill’s request, U.S. troops were to relieve British troops then garrisoned in Northern Ireland and were to be wholly responsible for the defense of that area rather than merely of U.S. bases there as previously agreed. This move, in addition to releasing British troops for service in more active theaters, seemed politically expedient in view of Eire’s attitude toward the war. A new plan for this project, MAGNET, was approved on 11 January.lg It called for the dispatch of the V Corps (reinforced) plus air and supply organizations. The first sizable contingent landed a t Belfast on 26 January,20 but because of more immediate needs in the Pacific, the movement was thereafter retarded. The air contingent was not scheduled for movement until late spring. The one European task force which was designed for early offen- sive action was the AAF bombardment force which, according to prewar plans, was to join the RAF in the attack on Germany. This project was approved informally at the first of the ARCADIA ses- sions, and reaffirmed on 1 3 January.’l The movement should begin “as soon as these forces and shipping become available.” In view of the desperate need for aircraft and crews in the Pacific and for the expanded training program, immediate deployment was impossible. Current opinion that the initial heavy bomber groups might move out in March 2 2 was to prove too optimistic. A plan for movements within the Western Hemisphere adopted on I 3 January 2 3 involved for the moment less shipping. It was agreed that, subject to the consent of the Netherlands government, U.S. troops should replace British garrisons in Aruba and Curaqao, and that the United States should continue to hold forces in reserve for the security of northeast Brazil against possible Axis thmsts.’* The most ambitious project considered for the first half of 1942 was the joint occupation of French Northwest and/or North Africa. Before Pearl Harbor, the U.S. Joint Board had worked tentatively on plans for the seizure of Dakar (JPB BLACK) and Casablanca (GYMNAST) to forestall any German move toward the South Atlantic and South America.25The British meanwhile had been think- ing of a possible landing in Tunisia, and at ARCADIA the joint planners were directed to weld the two concepts into a single plan (SUPER-GYMNAST) .26 In view of the many unpredictable factors involved in so complex an operation, and in view of the scale of 240
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