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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 5 …With the end of the war, Headquarters approved a plan for writing and publishing a seven…
  • p. 8 …The first hectic months after Pearl Harbor left little time in a military headquarters for consideration…
  • p. 9 …Department calling for the appointment by AAF Headquarters of a historian in accordance with the President…
  • p. 10 …After returning to Headquarters at the close of 1942, Colonel Williams found the pressure of a…
  • p. 11 …T h e first of those points, of course, was AAF Headquarters itself. Though the Army…
  • p. 12 …But, in developing a system of historical reporting from other headquarters, the “supporting docu- ments” received…
  • p. 13 …in the hurried atmosphere of a military headquarters, and it depended for its support upon men…
  • p. 14 …In most cases, however, the offer of professional assistance from AAF Headquarters was welcomed, though occasionally…
  • p. 15 …close of hostilities to bring into AAF Headquarters certain of the field per- sonnel for the…
  • p. 18 …Goss served as historian with the Fourth Air Force and was subsequently brought into AAF Headquarters…
  • p. 19 …Air Service Command, USSTAF, was assigned to Headquarters, USSTAF. Finally there remains something to be told…
  • p. 21 …Simpson of the Office of Air Force History, Headquarters, United States Air Force. Colonel Paul has…
  • p. 29 …JAPANESEINSTALLATIONS ON NORTHHEAD,KISKA,JULY1942 HEADQUARTERS,3 STH FIGHTERGROUP,PORT MORESBY,1942 HEADQUARTERS,3 gTH FIGHTERGROUP…
  • p. 45 …and his inspections took him to various headquarters, to depots and airfields, to-and over-the…
  • p. 53 …bulk of offensive air units to General Headquarters. The War Department resisted in turn every proposal…
  • p. 197 …The First Air Force, with headquarters at Mitchel Field, New York, was acting as a major…
  • p. 205 …The approved peacetime garrisons called for one heavy bombardment squadron and a group headquarters at Bermuda…
  • p. 209 …P-36’s in crates, and the headquarters squadron of the 28th Composite Group took up…
  • p. 210 …Defense Command, which forwarded the material to headquarters of the Western Defense Command at San Francisco…
  • p. 213 …Martin, was organized tactically into the 18th Bombardment Wing, with headquarters at Hickam Field, and the…
  • p. 214 …provided the separate squadrons with an air headquarters. Expansion of the Air Corps brought about a…
  • p. 221 …4th Composite Group, consisted of the Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, the 3d Pursuit Squadron, and the…
  • p. 222 …AAF Headquarters felt that a striking force of heavy bombers would be a necessary part of…
  • p. 226 …during a series of conferences at AAF Headquarters in Washington. On 16 November the military air…
  • p. 230 …The watchers were instructed to transmit their observations by telephone or telegraph to headquarters of the…
  • p. 232 …which prevailed over the preference of general headquarters for a more northern and presumably more secure…
  • p. 252 …It would appear that the files of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, are also i n…
  • p. 254 …to General Headquarters, General Brereton states that he returned to his own headquarters a t Nielson…
  • p. 255 …George, chief of staff, V Interceptor Command, reported to headquarters “that there are 54 airplanes in…
  • p. 257 …The Summary of Activi- ties for Headquarters, Far East Air Force, notes: “11:56 General Brereton…
  • p. 268 …At I I I 5 , inter- ceptor headquarters received specific warning of enemy aircraft approaching from…
  • p. 270 …with a tele- phone line to operations headquarters. Until the Del Monte base could be greatly…
  • p. 272 …O n another occasion, 2 7th Group headquarters was falsely informed by telephone that its A…
  • p. 275 …two PBY’s to establish a new headquarters in Au~tralia.~’By +he 29th of December…
  • p. 281 …mission.” lo* General Brereton established a temporary headquarters at Darwin. Though the aim of all operations…
  • p. 288 …the air planners and from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate. The translation of the…
  • p. 308 …General Headquarters was of recent origin, but the desirability of such a staff in the event…
  • p. 310 …both unit and individual training.88 General Headquarters’ responsibility for air force training was limited to…
  • p. 311 …WPD’s judgment that relations between General Headquarters and the Army Air Forces were “in- definite…
  • p. 312 …Gates.lo7 General Headquarters was not consulted until 5 February, but Gen- eral McNair had long…
  • p. 315 …In reality the influence of AAF Headquarters on the actual conduct of the war went far…
  • p. 344 …The director of Air Defense at AAF Headquarters concurred in every detail with the findings and…
  • p. 346 …With its headquarters a t San Francisco, the command included an extensive area of nine western…
  • p. 378 …The headquarters was established a t the main base a t Accra on 8 October 1941…
  • p. 400 …Here, in January 1942, the headquarters of the newly activated North Atlantic Sector of the Ferrying…
  • p. 405 …into the bases.‘38 Army Air Forces Headquarters, the Ferrying Command, and other interested AAF agencies…
  • p. 425 …was to be maintained between all major headquarters, logistical facilities would be shared, and local commanders…
  • p. 426 …O n 18 January, he located his headquarters at Lembang, ten miles north of Bandoeng in…
  • p. 434 …the United States and it was the headquarters of USAFIA, whose responsibility in January became chiefly…
  • p. 435 …the 2 I st Air Flotilla and headquarters detach- ments-moved to Davao during the first…
  • p. 442 …officers at Brisbane and of headquarters in Wash- ington throughout January. Australian and Dutch forces were…
  • p. 445 …organization, but co-ordination between its own headquarters and the Dutch interceptor control remained imperfect. T…
  • p. 454 …In Java, General Wavell closed his personal headquarters on 2 5 Feb- ruary, at which time…
  • p. 462 …Final Efforts in the Philippines When General Brereton’s headquarters had been moved to Austra- lia…
  • p. 482 …He proposed the establishment of air headquarters in each defensive area, prepared to accept and operate…
  • p. 486 …AAF Headquarters had been prompt to recognize the need for properly equipped photographic squadrons, and shortly…
  • p. 491 …In fact, A-3 of AAF Headquarters already had prepared a squadron, the 68th, which was…
  • p. 517 …Emmons, commanding the Hawaiian Depart- ment, appealed to AAF Headquarters for additional planes, and these were…
  • p. 546 HEADQUARTERS, 3STH FIGHTER GROUP, PORT MORESBY, 1942
  • p. 547 HEADQUARTERS, 35TH FIGHTER GROUP, PORT MORESBY, 1942
F U N D A M E N T A L B A S E S O F S T R A T E G Y
Against the decision to concentrate first against Hitler, with all the
priorities implied by that choice, was balanced the very pressing need
for reinforcement of the Philippines and of other positions in the Far
East. The limiting factor was not only-perhaps not principally-the
number of troops available. T h e shipping shortage which was to re-
main a brake on projected operations throughout much of the war
made impossible the immediate deployment of all those units which
were trained and equipped for action." But in spite of the over-all
priority given to the European war, some reinforcements had to be
sent to the Pacific, and because of the immense distances involved in
deploying troops in that area, it was only by adroit juggling of trans-
port facilities that even barest necessities could be met.
One inevitable but ironical concomitant of the primacy given to
the European theater was the knowledge that U.S. ground units sent
in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major
invasion of the continent was contemplated for 1942, though it was
considered expedient to hold in reserve forces which might take
advantage of any radical change in the situation. Hence it was that
most of the movements and projects designed for the Atlantic-
European theaters during the first half of that year were those prepar-
atory and precautionary deployments which had been set up in
RAINBOW No. 5 . T h e lesser movements to the Pacific bore, on the
contrary, the stamp of urgency. A more detailed discussion of some
of these projects in both Atlantic and Pacific will follow in appro-
priate chapters; here it is sufficient to list briefly the points at issue
and the decisions made.
T h e most considerable deployments in the Atlantic-European area
were those which had been designated in the prewar plans for the
British Isles and Iceland. T h e decision to substitute U.S. Army troops
for US. Marines and British troops in Iceland and for the British
garrison in Northern Ireland imposed severe demands upon combined
shipping facilities." Each move, however, offered important advan-
tages. Marines would be made available for projected amphibious
operations, and British troops would be released for service in the
Middle East, where they in turn would relieve Australian units needed
for the defense of their own homeland. T h e movement of U.S. Army
forces to Iceland had begun in August 1941,*:but because of the tight
shipping situation that project was not completed by the target date
* See above, pp. 158-60.
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