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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Cairo”26 pages
F U N D A M E N T A L B A S E S O F S T R A T E G Y Against the decision to concentrate first against Hitler, with all the priorities implied by that choice, was balanced the very pressing need for reinforcement of the Philippines and of other positions in the Far East. The limiting factor was not only-perhaps not principally-the number of troops available. T h e shipping shortage which was to re- main a brake on projected operations throughout much of the war made impossible the immediate deployment of all those units which were trained and equipped for action." But in spite of the over-all priority given to the European war, some reinforcements had to be sent to the Pacific, and because of the immense distances involved in deploying troops in that area, it was only by adroit juggling of trans- port facilities that even barest necessities could be met. One inevitable but ironical concomitant of the primacy given to the European theater was the knowledge that U.S. ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of the continent was contemplated for 1942, though it was considered expedient to hold in reserve forces which might take advantage of any radical change in the situation. Hence it was that most of the movements and projects designed for the Atlantic- European theaters during the first half of that year were those prepar- atory and precautionary deployments which had been set up in RAINBOW No. 5 . T h e lesser movements to the Pacific bore, on the contrary, the stamp of urgency. A more detailed discussion of some of these projects in both Atlantic and Pacific will follow in appro- priate chapters; here it is sufficient to list briefly the points at issue and the decisions made. T h e most considerable deployments in the Atlantic-European area were those which had been designated in the prewar plans for the British Isles and Iceland. T h e decision to substitute U.S. Army troops for US. Marines and British troops in Iceland and for the British garrison in Northern Ireland imposed severe demands upon combined shipping facilities." Each move, however, offered important advan- tages. Marines would be made available for projected amphibious operations, and British troops would be released for service in the Middle East, where they in turn would relieve Australian units needed for the defense of their own homeland. T h e movement of U.S. Army forces to Iceland had begun in August 1941,*:but because of the tight shipping situation that project was not completed by the target date * See above, pp. 158-60. 2 3 9
Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.