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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

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“United Press”36 pages

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
prosecution of the war.” l S A more specific description of the business
a t hand was contained in a suggested agenda radioed by the British
delegation en route on board HMS Duke of Y0rk.14This called for:
( I ) a redeclaration of the fundamental bases of joint strategy; ( 2 ) the
interpretation of this strategy into terms of immediate military meas-
ures; ( 3 ) the allocation of joint forces in harmony with the accepted
strategy; (4) the formulation of a continuing program to raise and
equip the forces called for in that strategy; and (5) the establishment
of joint machinery for directing the war effort. In general, this pre-
view may serve as a guide to the accomplishments of the conference.
If some of the tasks were only partially achieved, a solid foundation
was laid in each case.
The restatement of the basic Anglo-American strategy was at the
same time both the most important of the tasks and the most readily
completed. The British chiefs of staff early presented their views in
a memorandum which, with slight revisions by the Americans, was
approved on 31 De~ember.~’The strategy thus accepted was, “in
spite of recent events,” essentially a reaffirmation of the principles of
ABC-I . Again Germany was declared the chief enemy, the Atlantic
and Europe the areas in which the principal efforts should be applied.
The nature of the contemplated efforts was unchanged: defense of
production areas in North America and the United Kingdom to in-
sure realization of the Victory Program of munitions; maintenance
of designated lines of communication, both sea lanes and air routes;
forging and tightening a ring around Germany; weakening the Reich
by indirect methods and by a concentrated bomber attack; and prep-
aration for the eventual invasion of Germany. Meanwhile, in the
Pacific only such positions should be defended as would “safeguard
vital interests and deny Japan access to needed raw materials.”
The determination to concentrate an Germany first was the most
momentous strategic decision of the war, both in respect to the total
effort and to the role of the AAF. Apparently accepted without dis-
sent in the previous spring, that decision seemed less unimpeachable
in the flood tide of Japanese successes. It was not to go unchallenged
either within high military circles or in public, but it represented a
view of the war which had long been held by the air planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand strategy into terms of imme-
diate operations and allocations raised problems not so readily solved.
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