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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“King”32 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1 prosecution of the war.” l S A more specific description of the business a t hand was contained in a suggested agenda radioed by the British delegation en route on board HMS Duke of Y0rk.14This called for: ( I ) a redeclaration of the fundamental bases of joint strategy; ( 2 ) the interpretation of this strategy into terms of immediate military meas- ures; ( 3 ) the allocation of joint forces in harmony with the accepted strategy; (4) the formulation of a continuing program to raise and equip the forces called for in that strategy; and (5) the establishment of joint machinery for directing the war effort. In general, this pre- view may serve as a guide to the accomplishments of the conference. If some of the tasks were only partially achieved, a solid foundation was laid in each case. The restatement of the basic Anglo-American strategy was at the same time both the most important of the tasks and the most readily completed. The British chiefs of staff early presented their views in a memorandum which, with slight revisions by the Americans, was approved on 31 De~ember.~’The strategy thus accepted was, “in spite of recent events,” essentially a reaffirmation of the principles of ABC-I . Again Germany was declared the chief enemy, the Atlantic and Europe the areas in which the principal efforts should be applied. The nature of the contemplated efforts was unchanged: defense of production areas in North America and the United Kingdom to in- sure realization of the Victory Program of munitions; maintenance of designated lines of communication, both sea lanes and air routes; forging and tightening a ring around Germany; weakening the Reich by indirect methods and by a concentrated bomber attack; and prep- aration for the eventual invasion of Germany. Meanwhile, in the Pacific only such positions should be defended as would “safeguard vital interests and deny Japan access to needed raw materials.” The determination to concentrate an Germany first was the most momentous strategic decision of the war, both in respect to the total effort and to the role of the AAF. Apparently accepted without dis- sent in the previous spring, that decision seemed less unimpeachable in the flood tide of Japanese successes. It was not to go unchallenged either within high military circles or in public, but it represented a view of the war which had long been held by the air planners and from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate. The translation of the accepted grand strategy into terms of imme- diate operations and allocations raised problems not so readily solved. 2 3 8
Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.