The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
prosecution of the war.” l S A more specific description of the business
a t hand was contained in a suggested agenda radioed by the British
delegation en route on board HMS Duke of Y0rk.14This called for:
( I ) a redeclaration of the fundamental bases of joint strategy; ( 2 ) the
interpretation of this strategy into terms of immediate military meas-
ures; ( 3 ) the allocation of joint forces in harmony with the accepted
strategy; (4) the formulation of a continuing program to raise and
equip the forces called for in that strategy; and (5) the establishment
of joint machinery for directing the war effort. In general, this pre-
view may serve as a guide to the accomplishments of the conference.
If some of the tasks were only partially achieved, a solid foundation
was laid in each case.
The restatement of the basic Anglo-American strategy was at the
same time both the most important of the tasks and the most readily
completed. The British chiefs of staff early presented their views in
a memorandum which, with slight revisions by the Americans, was
approved on 31 De~ember.~’The strategy thus accepted was, “in
spite of recent events,” essentially a reaffirmation of the principles of
ABC-I . Again Germany was declared the chief enemy, the Atlantic
and Europe the areas in which the principal efforts should be applied.
The nature of the contemplated efforts was unchanged: defense of
production areas in North America and the United Kingdom to in-
sure realization of the Victory Program of munitions; maintenance
of designated lines of communication, both sea lanes and air routes;
forging and tightening a ring around Germany; weakening the Reich
by indirect methods and by a concentrated bomber attack; and prep-
aration for the eventual invasion of Germany. Meanwhile, in the
Pacific only such positions should be defended as would “safeguard
vital interests and deny Japan access to needed raw materials.”
The determination to concentrate an Germany first was the most
momentous strategic decision of the war, both in respect to the total
effort and to the role of the AAF. Apparently accepted without dis-
sent in the previous spring, that decision seemed less unimpeachable
in the flood tide of Japanese successes. It was not to go unchallenged
either within high military circles or in public, but it represented a
view of the war which had long been held by the air planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand strategy into terms of imme-
diate operations and allocations raised problems not so readily solved.
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