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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
F U N D A M E N T A L B A S E S O F S T R A T E G Y
reference to the broadest national policies and that firm decisions on
those policies must await further consultation with the British, whose
declaration of war against Japan had come with ours on 8 December.
The need for close co-ordination of the efforts of all anti-Axis
powers was recognized by the American government and its military
leaders. During World W a r I, the Allies had achieved unity of civilian
direction and military command only in the face of threatened defeat
in the last year of the conflict; the lesson had not gone unheeded. In
his request for a declaration of war against Germany and Italy, the
President emphasized the need of “rapid and united effort” by all
freedom-loving peoples in their struggle against the Axis power^.^
T h e Declaration of the United Nations, signed in Washington on
I January 1942 by twenty-six nations, gave a plcdge of mutual co-
operation, but the significance of that document was largely politi-
cal.’’ T h e most concrete military measure took the form of bilateral
agreements between the United States and the United Kingdom.
These agreements, while of special import to the two principal parties,
provided a workable means for co-ordinating the activities of the
British Commonwealth of Nations and of certain governments in
exile, through the influence of England, and of Latin-American re-
publics and China through that of the United States. Collaboration
with the U.S.S.R.-because of its geographical isolation, its neutrality
toward Japan, and the absence of any tradition of intimate relations
with the western powers-was to constitute a unique problem
throughout the war.
T h e A R C A D I A Conference: Over-all Strategy and
lmmediate Deployment
On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival in
Washington of Prime Minister Churchill, his chiefs of staff, and other
high-ranking British officials.” On the following evening, the British
party met with President Roosevelt and his military and civilian
advisers a t the White House.l* T h e conference thus inaugurated,
coded as ARCADIA, was in frequent session until 14 January. In his
address to the Congress on 26 December, the Prime Allinister declared
that he had come “in Order to meet the President of the United States
and to arrange with him for all that mapping out of our military plans
and for all those intimate meetings of the high officers of the armed
services of both countries which are indispensable to the successful
2 3 7

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.