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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
  • p. 226 …Air Service Command under Col. L.S. Churchill. Because of a shortage of experienced officers, only…
  • p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
  • p. 287 …the arrival in Washington of Prime Minister Churchill, his chiefs of staff, and other high-ranking…
  • p. 290 …stipulated in ABC-I. A t Mr. Churchill’s request, U.S. troops were to relieve…
  • p. 302 …the U.S. forces, and by Mr. Churchill as British Prime Minister and Minister of Defense…
  • p. 303 …Field Marshal Sir John Dill representing Mr. Churchill as Minister of De- fense. Sir John Dill…
  • p. 304 …of such a personal representative of Mr. Churchill might make difficult the maintenance of normal military…
  • p. 425 …O n the same day, Prime Minister Churchill informed Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell of his selection…
  • p. 628 …Western Hemisphere. When the President and Mr. Churchill met with their military staffs in the ARCADIA…
  • p. 630 …strong support in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered on 5 March, in which…
  • p. 636 …first in a gen- eral meeting with Churchill, later among the airmen alone.34Arnold reviewed the…
  • p. 639 …Much had happened in the two months which had passed since Churchill had approved that plan…
  • p. 640 …Duncan, chief of staff for the Eighth Air Force, wrote from Washington to Spaatz that Churchill…
  • p. 641 …postponement was al- most tantamount to refusal. Churchill was back in London by the 27th. In…
  • p. 642 …then back in Washington, that Roosevelt and Churchill “believed” that T O R C H was…
  • p. 661 …Even during the Battle of Britain, Churchill could tell the House of Commons that “there seems…
  • p. 705 …4 1 . ~ ~The following month, Prime Minister Churchill in conference with Messrs. Harry Hopkins and Averell…
  • p. 810 …2 0 August 1940, in R.S. Churchill, ed., Into Battle (London, 1941),p. 2 5…
  • p. 811 …comp., Winston Churchill’s Secret Session Speeches (New York, 1946), p. 85. 161. Larner report, as…
  • p. 845 …L.S., 182 Churchill, Prime Minister Winston, 133, 1369 141, 232, 235-37, 2409 2431 252…
F U N D A M E N T A L B A S E S O F S T R A T E G Y
reference to the broadest national policies and that firm decisions on
those policies must await further consultation with the British, whose
declaration of war against Japan had come with ours on 8 December.
The need for close co-ordination of the efforts of all anti-Axis
powers was recognized by the American government and its military
leaders. During World W a r I, the Allies had achieved unity of civilian
direction and military command only in the face of threatened defeat
in the last year of the conflict; the lesson had not gone unheeded. In
his request for a declaration of war against Germany and Italy, the
President emphasized the need of “rapid and united effort” by all
freedom-loving peoples in their struggle against the Axis power^.^
T h e Declaration of the United Nations, signed in Washington on
I January 1942 by twenty-six nations, gave a plcdge of mutual co-
operation, but the significance of that document was largely politi-
cal.’’ T h e most concrete military measure took the form of bilateral
agreements between the United States and the United Kingdom.
These agreements, while of special import to the two principal parties,
provided a workable means for co-ordinating the activities of the
British Commonwealth of Nations and of certain governments in
exile, through the influence of England, and of Latin-American re-
publics and China through that of the United States. Collaboration
with the U.S.S.R.-because of its geographical isolation, its neutrality
toward Japan, and the absence of any tradition of intimate relations
with the western powers-was to constitute a unique problem
throughout the war.
T h e A R C A D I A Conference: Over-all Strategy and
lmmediate Deployment
On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival in
Washington of Prime Minister Churchill, his chiefs of staff, and other
high-ranking British officials.” On the following evening, the British
party met with President Roosevelt and his military and civilian
advisers a t the White House.l* T h e conference thus inaugurated,
coded as ARCADIA, was in frequent session until 14 January. In his
address to the Congress on 26 December, the Prime Allinister declared
that he had come “in Order to meet the President of the United States
and to arrange with him for all that mapping out of our military plans
and for all those intimate meetings of the high officers of the armed
services of both countries which are indispensable to the successful
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.