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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Pacific Ocean”16 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1 quate strength of the U.S. armed forces, to our materiel commitments to England and the Soviet Union, and to the vast naval and military responsibilities which the British had elsewhere. But there was also an underestimation of Japanese capabilities both by commanders in the Far East and by leaders in Washington and London, and what- ever alarm may have been entertained over Japanese threats toward the south, there seems to have been little doubt of the ability of the associated powers to implement the strategy described in ABC-I . The overwhelming strength of the Japanese army was recognized, but inasmuch as its southward movement must be by sea, we counted on neutralizing, if not wholly containing, that strength by Allied naval and air striking forces. Initial Japanese successes cut at the very roots of this concept. By 10 December, the enemy had destroyed or immobilized the heavy units of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, had sunk the newly arrived British warships Repulse and Prince of Wales, and had wiped out in large part our air strength in Luzon and Oahu. Manila and Hong Kong, already under attack, were doomed, and the drive for Singapore had begun. With their striking power crippled and their main bases rendered ineffective, the associated powers could offer little resistance as the enemy pushed on pell-mell for the Neth- erlands East Indies. The swiftness of that rush was hardly appreciated in the first few days of the war, but already it was obvious that pre- war plans must be reviewed. Meanwhile RAINBOW No. 5, as revised in November, was in- voked-against Japan on 7 December, against Germany and Italy on the I I th-but with the proviso that Army task forces would be desig- nated and dispatched only in accord with subsequent W a r Department instructions.‘ Within the Air Staff there was an immediate, though momentary, reaction in favor of deploying all available air strength for defense of the Western Hemisphere and, if practicable, of Hawaii and the Philippines.? Within a week, however, AAF planners returned to a more familiar theme with a new long-term design for offensive war. This plan, called AWPD/4 ( I 5 December 1941) was hardly more than a restatement of the salient features of AWPD/I, with requirements somewhat inflated under the stimulus of war. It called for an air force of some 3,000,000 men and 90,000 planes, to be achieved by “giving NATIONAL FIRST PRIORITY TO THE PRODUCTION OF AIRCRAFT.” * This plan was not accepted. It was clear that the role of the AAF could be determined only in 2 36
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