“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
F U N D A M E N T A L B A S E S O F S T R A T E G Y
almost perfect unanimity of the vote in the Congress on our declara-
tion of war was symptomatic of the national temper.’ This did not
mean that criticism of the administration’s policies was completely
hushed-within a month after Pearl Harbor the basic war strategy
was under fire from intransigents in the press and in the Congress-
but the nation as a whole began to gird itself for a war effort on a
scale hitherto unprecedented.
If the national reaction to Pearl Harbor boded ill for the Axis
powers, there was still little cause for early optimism in the United
States. Indeed, the success of the Japanese attacks threatened momen-
tarily to disrupt the whole trend of our strategic thinking. T h e plans
which had been worked out in collaboration with the British earlier
in 1941had bccn oriented toward Germany. The Tripartite Pact ( 2 7
September 1940) had strengthened the belief that Japan would join
Germany should that nation go to war with the United States, but
Anglo-American military leaders considered it possible to contain
Japan by a strategic defensive until the defeat of Germany would
allow full force to be applied in the Pacific. From 1938 the United
States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em-
bargoes, but until summer of 1941 the administration had not been
so outspoken in its denunciation of Japanese activities as of German.
T h e President’s radio address of 2 7 May 1941,announcing the proc-
lamation of an unlimited national emergency, is indicative of this
policy: it was most frank in its description of the dangers we faced
from Hider’s government, but it contained no direct reference to
Japan.‘ To gain time for completing our defense measures, the ad-
ministration continued to negotiate through normal channels with
Japan until that nation began, late in July, to threaten southern Indo-
China. A Japanese move in that direction would have isolated the
Philippines and menaced both the Netherlands East Indies and lines
of communication essential to the security of Great Britain itself.
Immediately the United States began to stiffen its p ~ l i c y , ~and at the
Atlantic conference in mid-August the President and Prime Minister
agreed to act along parallel lines in warning Japan.‘ From there on,
relations between the United States and Japan steadily worsened until
by 2 6 November they had reached a crisis.5 Hurried steps had been
taken to reinforce American outposts in the Pacific, and by the British
to improve the defenses of Singapore. In each case the efforts were
limited in nature. T o a large extent this was due to the as yet inade-
235