“Headquarters”60+ pages
- p. 5 …With the end of the war, Headquarters approved a plan for
writing and publishing a seven…
- p. 8 …The first hectic months after Pearl
Harbor left little time in a military headquarters for consideration…
- p. 9 …Department calling for the appointment by AAF Headquarters of a
historian in accordance with the President…
- p. 10 …After returning
to Headquarters at the close of 1942, Colonel Williams found the
pressure of a…
- p. 11 …T h e first of those points, of course, was AAF
Headquarters itself. Though the Army…
- p. 12 …But, in developing a system
of historical reporting from other headquarters, the “supporting docu-
ments” received…
- p. 13 …in the hurried atmosphere of a military headquarters, and it depended
for its support upon men…
- p. 14 …In most cases, however, the offer of professional assistance from AAF
Headquarters was welcomed, though occasionally…
- p. 15 …close
of hostilities to bring into AAF Headquarters certain of the field per-
sonnel for the…
- p. 18 …Goss served as historian with the Fourth Air
Force and was subsequently brought into AAF Headquarters…
- p. 19 …Air Service Command,
USSTAF, was assigned to Headquarters, USSTAF.
Finally there remains something to be told…
- p. 21 …Simpson of the Office of
Air Force History, Headquarters, United States Air Force. Colonel
Paul has…
- p. 29 …JAPANESEINSTALLATIONS ON NORTHHEAD,KISKA,JULY1942
HEADQUARTERS,3 STH FIGHTERGROUP,PORT MORESBY,1942
HEADQUARTERS,3 gTH FIGHTERGROUP…
- p. 45 …and his
inspections took him to various headquarters, to depots and airfields,
to-and over-the…
- p. 53 …bulk of offensive air units to General Headquarters.
The War Department resisted in turn every proposal…
- p. 197 …The First Air Force, with headquarters at Mitchel Field, New
York, was acting as a major…
- p. 205 …The
approved peacetime garrisons called for one heavy bombardment
squadron and a group headquarters at Bermuda…
- p. 209 …P-36’s in crates, and the headquarters squadron
of the 28th Composite Group took up…
- p. 210 …Defense
Command, which forwarded the material to headquarters of the
Western Defense Command at San Francisco…
- p. 213 …Martin, was organized tactically
into the 18th Bombardment Wing, with headquarters at Hickam
Field, and the…
- p. 214 …provided the separate squadrons
with an air headquarters. Expansion of the Air Corps brought about
a…
- p. 221 …4th Composite Group, consisted of the
Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, the 3d Pursuit Squadron,
and the…
- p. 222 …AAF Headquarters felt that a striking force of
heavy bombers would be a necessary part of…
- p. 226 …during
a series of conferences at AAF Headquarters in Washington. On 16
November the military air…
- p. 230 …The watchers were
instructed to transmit their observations by telephone or telegraph to
headquarters of the…
- p. 232 …which prevailed over the preference of general
headquarters for a more northern and presumably more secure…
- p. 252 …It would appear that the files of General Headquarters, Southwest
Pacific Area, are also i n…
- p. 254 …to General Headquarters, General
Brereton states that he returned to his own headquarters a t Nielson…
- p. 255 …George, chief of staff, V Interceptor Command, reported
to headquarters “that there are 54 airplanes in…
- p. 257 …The Summary of Activi-
ties for Headquarters, Far East Air Force, notes: “11:56 General
Brereton…
- p. 268 …At I I I 5 , inter-
ceptor headquarters received specific warning of enemy aircraft
approaching from…
- p. 270 …with a tele-
phone line to operations headquarters. Until the Del Monte base could
be greatly…
- p. 272 …O n another
occasion, 2 7th Group headquarters was falsely informed by telephone
that its A…
- p. 275 …two PBY’s to establish a new headquarters in Au~tralia.~’By +he
29th of December…
- p. 281 …mission.” lo*
General Brereton established a temporary headquarters at Darwin.
Though the aim of all operations…
- p. 288 …the air planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the…
- p. 308 …General Headquarters was of recent origin, but the desirability of
such a staff in the event…
- p. 310 …both unit and individual training.88 General Headquarters’
responsibility for air force training was limited to…
- p. 311 …WPD’s judgment that relations
between General Headquarters and the Army Air Forces were “in-
definite…
- p. 312 …Gates.lo7
General Headquarters was not consulted until 5 February, but Gen-
eral McNair had long…
- p. 315 …In reality the influence of AAF Headquarters on the actual conduct
of the war went far…
- p. 344 …The director of Air Defense at AAF
Headquarters concurred in every detail with the findings and…
- p. 346 …With its headquarters a t San Francisco, the command
included an extensive area of nine western…
- p. 378 …The headquarters was
established a t the main base a t Accra on 8 October 1941…
- p. 400 …Here, in January 1942, the headquarters
of the newly activated North Atlantic Sector of the Ferrying…
- p. 405 …into the bases.‘38
Army Air Forces Headquarters, the Ferrying Command, and other
interested AAF agencies…
- p. 425 …was to be maintained
between all major headquarters, logistical facilities would be shared,
and local commanders…
- p. 426 …O n 18 January, he located his headquarters at Lembang, ten miles north of
Bandoeng in…
- p. 434 …the United
States and it was the headquarters of USAFIA, whose responsibility in
January became chiefly…
- p. 435 …the 2 I st Air Flotilla and headquarters detach-
ments-moved to Davao during the first…
- p. 442 …officers at Brisbane and of headquarters in Wash-
ington throughout January. Australian and Dutch forces were…
- p. 445 …organization, but co-ordination between its own
headquarters and the Dutch interceptor control remained imperfect.
T…
- p. 454 …In Java, General Wavell closed his personal headquarters on 2 5 Feb-
ruary, at which time…
- p. 462 …Final Efforts in the Philippines
When General Brereton’s headquarters had been moved to Austra-
lia…
- p. 482 …He proposed the establishment of
air headquarters in each defensive area, prepared to accept and operate…
- p. 486 …AAF Headquarters had been prompt to recognize the need
for properly equipped photographic squadrons, and shortly…
- p. 491 …In fact, A-3 of AAF Headquarters already had prepared a squadron,
the 68th, which was…
- p. 517 …Emmons, commanding the Hawaiian Depart-
ment, appealed to AAF Headquarters for additional planes, and these
were…
- p. 546 HEADQUARTERS, 3STH FIGHTER GROUP, PORT MORESBY, 1942
- p. 547 HEADQUARTERS, 35TH FIGHTER GROUP, PORT MORESBY, 1942
F U N D A M E N T A L B A S E S O F S T R A T E G Y
almost perfect unanimity of the vote in the Congress on our declara-
tion of war was symptomatic of the national temper.’ This did not
mean that criticism of the administration’s policies was completely
hushed-within a month after Pearl Harbor the basic war strategy
was under fire from intransigents in the press and in the Congress-
but the nation as a whole began to gird itself for a war effort on a
scale hitherto unprecedented.
If the national reaction to Pearl Harbor boded ill for the Axis
powers, there was still little cause for early optimism in the United
States. Indeed, the success of the Japanese attacks threatened momen-
tarily to disrupt the whole trend of our strategic thinking. T h e plans
which had been worked out in collaboration with the British earlier
in 1941had bccn oriented toward Germany. The Tripartite Pact ( 2 7
September 1940) had strengthened the belief that Japan would join
Germany should that nation go to war with the United States, but
Anglo-American military leaders considered it possible to contain
Japan by a strategic defensive until the defeat of Germany would
allow full force to be applied in the Pacific. From 1938 the United
States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em-
bargoes, but until summer of 1941 the administration had not been
so outspoken in its denunciation of Japanese activities as of German.
T h e President’s radio address of 2 7 May 1941,announcing the proc-
lamation of an unlimited national emergency, is indicative of this
policy: it was most frank in its description of the dangers we faced
from Hider’s government, but it contained no direct reference to
Japan.‘ To gain time for completing our defense measures, the ad-
ministration continued to negotiate through normal channels with
Japan until that nation began, late in July, to threaten southern Indo-
China. A Japanese move in that direction would have isolated the
Philippines and menaced both the Netherlands East Indies and lines
of communication essential to the security of Great Britain itself.
Immediately the United States began to stiffen its p ~ l i c y , ~and at the
Atlantic conference in mid-August the President and Prime Minister
agreed to act along parallel lines in warning Japan.‘ From there on,
relations between the United States and Japan steadily worsened until
by 2 6 November they had reached a crisis.5 Hurried steps had been
taken to reinforce American outposts in the Pacific, and by the British
to improve the defenses of Singapore. In each case the efforts were
limited in nature. T o a large extent this was due to the as yet inade-
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