The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
prospect of getting substantial, even though limited, reinforcements
to MacArthur. There were also grounds for hoping that heavy
bomber units now based on Darwin might increase the weight of their
operations against Philippine targets. The Japanese by a landing on
Wake Island on 2 3 December had cut the only tested air route for
movement of that type of plane, but progress on construction of a
ferry route through the South Pacific offered grounds for hope that
the inaugural flight could be made even in advance of the scheduled
date of 15 January. Both the Army and the Navy were working
feverishly to provide a t least minimum facilities on Christmas, Canton,
Samoa, the Fijis, and New Caled~nia.~'At the same time, steps were
being taken to extend the ferry route across the South Atlantic beyond
Africa to India and the Netherlands East Indies.* But again, the weight
of the bombing effort that could be made would depend in no small
part on the resources of an Australian base, and the task of developing
such a base was tremendous.
Its establishment depended almost entirely upon the arrival of per-
sonnel, supplies, and equipment from the United States. General Mar-
shall had suggested that Australian resources be utilized as much as
possible in order to relieve the burden on American transport, but the
industrial facilities of Australia were limited a t best and, moreover,
the nation was already hard pressed to supply the needs of its own
armed forces, Of more immediate concern were the handicaps imposed
by Australia's transportation system. Military necessity gave the great-
est strategic importance to that section of the country which had
been least developed; the main centers of population, wealth, and
transportation were in the southeast, whereas the north and northeast
now held the position of key military importance. The difficulty of
transporting goods overland from Brisbane to Darwin was as great as
from Darwin to the Philippines, if not so dangerous. N o railroad con-
nected the two cities, which were 2,500 miles apart by the most
expeditious land route. For over a quarter of this distance only a
rough motor road cut through the central desert, and this road ended
approximately 300 miles from Darwin to connect with a railway
capable of carrying no more than 300 tons of freight per day. Repair
facilities were inadequate for maintenance of either road or railway,
and some of the rolling stock literally buckled under the weight of
heavy American equipment.Os The problem of storage facilities was
* See below, pp. 329-31.
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