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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Churchill”21 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1 prospect of getting substantial, even though limited, reinforcements to MacArthur. There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase the weight of their operations against Philippine targets. The Japanese by a landing on Wake Island on 2 3 December had cut the only tested air route for movement of that type of plane, but progress on construction of a ferry route through the South Pacific offered grounds for hope that the inaugural flight could be made even in advance of the scheduled date of 15 January. Both the Army and the Navy were working feverishly to provide a t least minimum facilities on Christmas, Canton, Samoa, the Fijis, and New Caled~nia.~'At the same time, steps were being taken to extend the ferry route across the South Atlantic beyond Africa to India and the Netherlands East Indies.* But again, the weight of the bombing effort that could be made would depend in no small part on the resources of an Australian base, and the task of developing such a base was tremendous. Its establishment depended almost entirely upon the arrival of per- sonnel, supplies, and equipment from the United States. General Mar- shall had suggested that Australian resources be utilized as much as possible in order to relieve the burden on American transport, but the industrial facilities of Australia were limited a t best and, moreover, the nation was already hard pressed to supply the needs of its own armed forces, Of more immediate concern were the handicaps imposed by Australia's transportation system. Military necessity gave the great- est strategic importance to that section of the country which had been least developed; the main centers of population, wealth, and transportation were in the southeast, whereas the north and northeast now held the position of key military importance. The difficulty of transporting goods overland from Brisbane to Darwin was as great as from Darwin to the Philippines, if not so dangerous. N o railroad con- nected the two cities, which were 2,500 miles apart by the most expeditious land route. For over a quarter of this distance only a rough motor road cut through the central desert, and this road ended approximately 300 miles from Darwin to connect with a railway capable of carrying no more than 300 tons of freight per day. Repair facilities were inadequate for maintenance of either road or railway, and some of the rolling stock literally buckled under the weight of heavy American equipment.Os The problem of storage facilities was * See below, pp. 329-31. 2 2 8
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