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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
P E A R L H A R B O R A N D C L A R K F I E L D
arrived and on the following day began its debarkation. Arrangements
had been made for quartering the American troops on the grounds of
the local Ascot and Doomben race tracks, with tenting and messing
facilities provided by the Australian army, and for the use of the
near-by Archerfield and Amberley airdromes for assembly of the
aircraft. *
Several factors interfered with a speedy execution of plans. T h e
convoy had been loaded on a peacetime basis, with little attention to
the advantage of placing equipment on the same vessel with its desig-
nated unit. In order to find the organizational equipment of the troops
who were to remain in Australia and the parts for aircraft to be assem-
bled there, it proved necessary to unload practically the entire cargo,
sort it, and reload such of it as was destined for shipment north to the
Philippines. Even then vital parts of the A-24’s-trigger motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search for missing parts, it was decided to reload equipment
scheduled for water transport on the two fastest ships, the Holbrook
and the Bloemfontein. With Australian dockworkers assisting in the
effort through twenty-four hours of the day, the reloading was com-
pleted by 2 8 December. The Holbrook sailed immediately; the Bloenz-
fontein, delayed until its captain received clarification of orders from
Dutch authorities, left the next day.95
Though the initial steps toward reinforcement of the Philippines
had thus been taken, further delays would frustrate the effort. Assem-
bly of the planes was accomplished in short order, but the missing
parts of the A-24’s were never found; and since they were not avail-
able in Australia, it was necessary to await their shipment from the
United States, whence they were dispatched by air early in January.
Moreover, it had been discovered that there was no Prestone for the
P-~o’s,and though some was eventually rounded up in Australia, this
entailed still another delay.g6 And immediate difficulties of this sort,
despite the urgent need for planes on Bataan, were incidental to the
more important task of establishing a base in Australia that could main-
tain a continuing flow of reinforcements to Luzon. T h e war had
caught the United States midway in a program for air reinforcement
of the Philippines-planes, personnel, and equipment had already been
allocated for the purpose and their movement in many instances had
been started. If the problems involved in channeling their movement
through an Australian base could be promptly solved, there was a real
2 2 7

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.