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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 44 …By Armistice Day forty-five squadrons had been assigned to the front.” But with delays at…
  • p. 47 …up of aircraft from the RAF’s Independent Force, the whole of the French Air Division…
  • p. 48 …One day mission was sufficiently large and suc- cessful to draw more than passing attention. O…
  • p. 80 …resignation from the Army came on the day after T R 440-15 was published. But…
  • p. 186 …War Plans Division to prepare the estimate independently as an Air Staff agency rather than as…
  • p. 258 …Roosevelt attempt curve our independence stop we all know than unless the US has not oppressed…
  • p. 317 …AAF officers were schooled to avoid use of the term “independent air force,” but in most…
  • p. 435 …Brady during days devoted by General Brereton chiefly to consultation with Aus- tralian, British, and Dutch…
  • p. 710 …During World War I, American military forces in Europe had achieved organizational and operational independence, but…
P E A R L H A R B O R A N D C L A R K F I E L D
tageous” to have 2 0 0 pursuit and 50 dive bombers delivered to the
Philippines by aircraft carrier. Fields for these planes he felt could be
maintained satisfactorily, and he pointed out that airdrome construc-
tion following the outbreak of war had been accelerated. His engineers
had reported that Clark, Nichols, San Marcelino, and Del Carmen
fields on Luzon could be maintained in operating condition, and that
some eight or ten additional strips would be ready by the last of
December.”
Nor had Washington abandoned plans for support of the Philip-
pines. President Roosevelt specifically directed that reinforcements
should be sent there with all speed, and MacArthur was informed on
I 5 December not only that the strategic importance of the Philippines
was fully recognized but that there would be no wavering in the deter-
mination to provide support. In partial fulfilment of the promise, the
dispatch of sixty-five new heavy bombers had been authorized in
addition to fifteen LB-~o’srepossessed from the British, a transfer to
be completed by 2 1 February 1942, and MacArthur was further
informed on 2 3 December that these planes, to be ferried via the South
Atlantic and India,” would come under his control at Bangal~re.’~
It soon became evident, however, that the time factor outweighed
all others. T h e Japanese were pressing down from their northern land-
ings; in the south the city of Davao, with its fifth column of some
30,000 Japanese, was easily overrun on 2 0 December; and by that date
the heavy elements of the Japanese Second Fleet had moved north to
cover the main enemy landing on 2 0 - 2 I December at Lingayen Gulf.
MacArthur’s strategy against this assault was based upon a plan which
“had been on the books” for many years. It consisted of delaying
actions in central Luzon and a retreat to Bataan where, it was hoped,
the limited forces available would serve as a buffer for C o r r e g i d ~ r . ~ ~
Except for reconnaissance missions carried out by pursuit pilots,
the air force could offer little support to the hard pressed infantry in
this withdrawal. From its distant base at Darwin the 19th Group
undertook on 2 2 December to mount a mission of nine B-17’s in
accordance with a plan to use Del Monte as a staging point for refuel-
ing and rearming. Having taken off from Batchelor Field, they swept
over Davao Gulf at sunset and dropped 3 0 x 500-lb. bombs on a
cluster of seven ships. No pursuit or A A interfered with the attack,
but visibility was poor and results were negligible. The B-17’s landed
* See below, pp. 331-33.
2 2 3

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.