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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Cairo”26 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1 to withdraw the bombers to a base that would afford an opportunity for a thorough overhaul of the already badly battered planes.” The decision had been made none too soon. On 16 December, mechanics began to service the bombers for the 1,500-mile flight to Darwin. Three days later, Del Monte experienced its first serious air attack. As dusk fell that day, three B-I 8’s had just landed, one of them bringing General Clagett from Manila, and before they could be dis- persed and camouflaged with coconut leaves, twelve enemy fighters skimmed the field to destroy the bombers by strafing. Several camou- flaged B- I 7’s, loading for their trip to Australia, were overlooked and took off that night as scheduled to join others which had reached Australia during the preceding two days. Within another two days the last of the B - 1 7 ’ ~ ~making a total of fourteen, arrived at Batchelor Field near Darwin.79 In spite of the decision to transfer all heavy bombers to Australia, there was no intention of abandoning the defense of the Philippines. The morale of officers and men on Luzon remained high, in part at least because they constantly expected the arrival of reinforcements. According to one writer, the Army at this time traveled as much on rumors as on its stomach. One day there was news that the Navy was coming to the rescue, “sweeping everything before it.” Again “some- one” heard that Dewey Boulevard was lined with A-20’s. O n another occasion, 2 7th Group headquarters was falsely informed by telephone that its A-24’~were being unloaded at the dock. A rush to the docks revealed nothing except, as the group historian recorded, “that there was probably a Fifth Columnist or two on Luzon and they had our number.” Hope was not confined to the rank and file. General MacArthur throughout December thought that the Philippines could be rein- forced, mentioning in his communications to Washington the possi- bility of early air counterattacks against Formosa. It was his feeling, however, that first priority in allocations to his theater should consist of pursuit planes and bombs to be brought in by aircraft carrier. “High-flying bombardment aircraft” and ground troops were rated by him as of secondary importance.81 General Brereton also believed that hope need not be abandoned. On 14 December he listed for Mac- Arthur ten squadrons of pursuit aircraft as an immediate requirement, indicating that in addition to the 5 2 A-24’s and 18 pursuit planes expected in Australia before the end of the month, it would be “advan- 2 2 2
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