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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1 enemy land-based aviation, it was already apparent that American bomber operations would be still further restricted. Even before the completion of these missions of the 10th it had become apparent that Clark Field was no longer suited for service even as a staging point for bomber operations. By the close of the next day all of the B-17’s but one, which came in from Cebu on the 13th, had fallen back on the Mindanao base.70 If any doubt persisted as to the necessity for this move, that doubt had been removed by a heavy Japanese attack on Nichols Field and the naval base a t Cavite just after midday on the 10th. At I I I 5 , inter- ceptor headquarters received specific warning of enemy aircraft approaching from the north, and for their interception dispatched planes of the 17th Squadron to Manila Bay, of the 21st to the port area of the city, and of the 34th to Bataan. A large number of enemy bombers escorted by an estimated IOO fighters roared over Nichols Field and Cavite, systematically bombing and strafing air installations, docks, and supply centers. American pursuits were overwhelmed in their attempts to break up the enemy’s bomber formations. The experience of the 17th Squadron, whose ten p-40’~found themselves confronted by a force of some fifty bombers and forty fighters, was typical of the action. When the Americans undertook to engage the bombers, enemy fighters thwarted almost every effort, and after some minutes the P-40’s were forced to break away because of a shortage of fuel. One pilot, Lt. William M. Rowe, shook off pursuing enemy fighters by taking “a long dive a t the ground,” and made for Del Car- men Field north of Manila only to find the field under a strafing attack. Turning back toward Clark Field, he landed there safely with no more than two gallons of fuel left. In the engagement, the Ameri- cans had lost three planes with no apparent damage to the enemy.” At Cavite the power plant, industrial facilities, and supply depots had been “completely ruined.” The submarine Sea Lion had been sunk and other naval craft damaged.” The Interceptor Command, now left with only thirty pursuit aircraft, including eight outmoded P-3 5’s and not counting one or two virtually useless P-26’s, could no longer promise for either air or naval installations even a semblance of ade- quate prote~tion.~’It was immediately decided to conserve the few planes remaining by using them chiefly for purposes of reconnais- sance-a decision which meant that our bases on Luzon would be even more vulnerable to enemy air attack than before.74 2 1 8
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