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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“The Wash”17 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I I Montgomery, proceeded toward the enemy beachhead a t Vigan. O’Donnell, first to arrive over the target area, made several runs at 2 5 , 0 0 0 feet against what was mistakenly thought to be an aircraft carrier. Mechanical trouble with the bomb racks as well as antiaircraft fire interfered with the bombing, and it took approximately forty-five minutes to drop eight 600-lb. bombs. No hits were observed. Parse1 had better success. He made two bomb runs from 12,500 feet. On the first, four 300-lb. bombs were directed against a cruiser or destroyer without effect, but of the three bombs dropped during the second run, a t least one direct hit on a transport was claimed. Montgomery had been allowed time to load only one 600-lb. bomb when he was ordered off Clark Field for the security of his plane. He proceeded to Vigan, however, and dropped his bomb in the water near the t r a n s p o r t ~ . ~ ~ The two remaining B-17’s took off from Clark Field at approximately 0930 to attack Japanese landing craft, transports, and their naval escort near Aparri. Lt. G.E. Schaetzel, pilot of one of the planes, in making a run over several transports at 2 5 , 0 0 0 feet, apparently scored a hit. The B-17, pounded by antiaircraft fire and under attack by enemy pursuit, was severely damaged, but no one in the bomber was injured and Schaetzel succeeded in reaching San Marcelino.64 Capt. Colin Kelly in the fifth bomber had been directed to locate and if possible sink an aircraft carrier previously reported along the northern Luzon coast. After a search of the target area he found no sign of a carrier, but Lt. Joe M. Bean, his navigator, had spotted a large Japanese warship which the aircrew took for a battles hi^.^^ Indeed, early reports of the ensuing action placed the ship in either the Harzlrna or the Yawisbiro class.66Actually, it is now known that no Japanese battleship participated in the initial invasion of the Philippines, and that the Haruna, the favored choice in subsequent reports, was engaged until I 8 December in support of the Malayan campaign. Since training in identification of naval craft was imperfect and many Japa- nese cruisers were as long or longer than some American battleships, it is not surprising that such mistakes of identification were made, even by the presumably better-trained Navy air personnel. At any rate, Navy PBY’s claimed on the following day to have hit a ship of the H a m a class in this same general area. Japanese sources indicate that the ship picked out by Lieutenant Bean was in fact the heavy cruiser Ashigara, flagship of the Third Fleet in its current operation.6T As it moved slowly on the outskirts of the enemy convoy it made a 2 16
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