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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
  • p. 226 …Air Service Command under Col. L.S. Churchill. Because of a shortage of experienced officers, only…
  • p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
  • p. 287 …the arrival in Washington of Prime Minister Churchill, his chiefs of staff, and other high-ranking…
  • p. 290 …stipulated in ABC-I. A t Mr. Churchill’s request, U.S. troops were to relieve…
  • p. 302 …the U.S. forces, and by Mr. Churchill as British Prime Minister and Minister of Defense…
  • p. 303 …Field Marshal Sir John Dill representing Mr. Churchill as Minister of De- fense. Sir John Dill…
  • p. 304 …of such a personal representative of Mr. Churchill might make difficult the maintenance of normal military…
  • p. 425 …O n the same day, Prime Minister Churchill informed Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell of his selection…
  • p. 628 …Western Hemisphere. When the President and Mr. Churchill met with their military staffs in the ARCADIA…
  • p. 630 …strong support in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered on 5 March, in which…
  • p. 636 …first in a gen- eral meeting with Churchill, later among the airmen alone.34Arnold reviewed the…
  • p. 639 …Much had happened in the two months which had passed since Churchill had approved that plan…
  • p. 640 …Duncan, chief of staff for the Eighth Air Force, wrote from Washington to Spaatz that Churchill…
  • p. 641 …postponement was al- most tantamount to refusal. Churchill was back in London by the 27th. In…
  • p. 642 …then back in Washington, that Roosevelt and Churchill “believed” that T O R C H was…
  • p. 661 …Even during the Battle of Britain, Churchill could tell the House of Commons that “there seems…
  • p. 705 …4 1 . ~ ~The following month, Prime Minister Churchill in conference with Messrs. Harry Hopkins and Averell…
  • p. 810 …2 0 August 1940, in R.S. Churchill, ed., Into Battle (London, 1941),p. 2 5…
  • p. 811 …comp., Winston Churchill’s Secret Session Speeches (New York, 1946), p. 85. 161. Larner report, as…
  • p. 845 …L.S., 182 Churchill, Prime Minister Winston, 133, 1369 141, 232, 235-37, 2409 2431 252…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I I
Montgomery, proceeded toward the enemy beachhead a t Vigan.
O’Donnell, first to arrive over the target area, made several runs at
2 5 , 0 0 0 feet against what was mistakenly thought to be an aircraft
carrier. Mechanical trouble with the bomb racks as well as antiaircraft
fire interfered with the bombing, and it took approximately forty-five
minutes to drop eight 600-lb. bombs. No hits were observed. Parse1
had better success. He made two bomb runs from 12,500 feet. On the
first, four 300-lb. bombs were directed against a cruiser or destroyer
without effect, but of the three bombs dropped during the second run,
a t least one direct hit on a transport was claimed. Montgomery had
been allowed time to load only one 600-lb. bomb when he was ordered
off Clark Field for the security of his plane. He proceeded to Vigan,
however, and dropped his bomb in the water near the t r a n s p o r t ~ . ~ ~
The two remaining B-17’s took off from Clark Field at approximately
0930 to attack Japanese landing craft, transports, and their naval escort
near Aparri. Lt. G.E. Schaetzel, pilot of one of the planes, in making
a run over several transports at 2 5 , 0 0 0 feet, apparently scored a hit.
The B-17, pounded by antiaircraft fire and under attack by enemy
pursuit, was severely damaged, but no one in the bomber was injured
and Schaetzel succeeded in reaching San Marcelino.64
Capt. Colin Kelly in the fifth bomber had been directed to locate
and if possible sink an aircraft carrier previously reported along the
northern Luzon coast. After a search of the target area he found no
sign of a carrier, but Lt. Joe M. Bean, his navigator, had spotted a large
Japanese warship which the aircrew took for a battles hi^.^^ Indeed,
early reports of the ensuing action placed the ship in either the Harzlrna
or the Yawisbiro class.66Actually, it is now known that no Japanese
battleship participated in the initial invasion of the Philippines, and
that the Haruna, the favored choice in subsequent reports, was
engaged until I 8 December in support of the Malayan campaign. Since
training in identification of naval craft was imperfect and many Japa-
nese cruisers were as long or longer than some American battleships,
it is not surprising that such mistakes of identification were made, even
by the presumably better-trained Navy air personnel. At any rate,
Navy PBY’s claimed on the following day to have hit a ship of the
H a m a class in this same general area. Japanese sources indicate that
the ship picked out by Lieutenant Bean was in fact the heavy cruiser
Ashigara, flagship of the Third Fleet in its current operation.6T
As it moved slowly on the outskirts of the enemy convoy it made a
2 16

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