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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 5 …Imprint N March 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt wrote to the Director of the Bureau of…
  • p. 138 …1939-4I N 28 January 1938 President Roosevelt declared our national defenses inadequate in the face…
  • p. 141 …changed our requirements for defensive aviation,” President Roosevelt strongly urged that $300,- ooo,ooo be appropriated…
  • p. 153 …When President Roosevelt initiated the move toward re- I 16
  • p. 160 …T h e first step was made public on 3 September 1940 when President Roosevelt revealed…
  • p. 165 …These sentiments were expressed by President Roosevelt in a radio address on 3 September: “This Nation…
  • p. 169 …In an address to Congress on 6 January 1941, President Roosevelt suggested the means; 9 5…
  • p. 170 …O n 9 July 1941, President Roosevelt requested the secretaries of W a r and the…
  • p. 171 …The British had prepared, a t the instigation of President Roosevelt, an estimate of munitions requirements…
  • p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
  • p. 174 …cent; other nations, 10 per cent.'" President Roosevelt, anxious that as many planes as possible be…
  • p. 185 …President Roosevelt’s request for the report had been motivated wholly by considerations of logistics. But…
  • p. 199 …On 5 July 1941 President Roosevelt, in oral orders to the Army Chief of Staff and…
  • p. 220 …and it carried a threat which President Roosevelt described in terms of the greatest danger faced…
  • p. 258 …conflict between Japan and the U.S. Roosevelt attempt curve our independence stop we all know…
  • p. 273 …President Roosevelt specifically directed that reinforcements should be sent there with all speed, and MacArthur was…
  • p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
  • p. 287 …evening, the British party met with President Roosevelt and his military and civilian advisers a t…
  • p. 297 …O n 3 January President Roosevelt sent Mr. Stimson a list of muni- tions, with a…
  • p. 301 …In his address to the Congress on 6 January, President Roosevelt promised that “we shall not…
  • p. 302 …Ultimate decisions on major military policies were taken by President Roosevelt, as Commander in Chief of…
  • p. 304 …Leahy as personal chief of staff to President Roosevelt in place of Admiral Stark.'* It was…
  • p. 322 …given to the nation by Presi- dent Roosevelt in a radio address on 9 D e…
  • p. 331 …At the end of January, President Roosevelt advised the President of Venezuela that, in deference to…
  • p. 332 …During the course of a fireside report to the nation delivered by President Roosevelt on 2…
  • p. 352 …Secretary Stimson reported to President Roosevelt his conviction that the planes from even one carrier could…
  • p. 366 …raised objections which seemed convincing.8 President Roosevelt decided to adopt the more modest proposal of…
  • p. 370 …Elliott Roosevelt during the summer on an aerial survey of the east coast of Greenland in…
  • p. 400 …Elliott Roosevelt and others failed to locate a suitable site for an airdrome.120A satisfactory site…
  • p. 409 …mobilizing the resources of the airlines, President Roosevelt had signed an executive order on 13 December…
  • p. 465 …for effective resistance in the Philippines, President Roosevelt had decided early in February that the general…
  • p. 480 …the basis of a proposal by President Roosevelt: there would be a separate Southwest Pacific Area…
  • p. 499 …Apparently President Roosevelt himself played a role in initiating the expedition, although it is not possible…
  • p. 553 …Lauchlin Currie had gone to China as economic adviser to President Roosevelt for study of her…
  • p. 630 …in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered on 5 March, in which the Prime…
  • p. 632 …plan was approved in principle by President Roosevelt, and on 8 April General Marshall and Harry…
  • p. 633 …message of 1 7 April, in- formed Roosevelt of his approval of the design; his sole…
  • p. 635 …A fortnight later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were alarmed by a query from Roosevelt as…
  • p. 640 …in Norway-and they understood that President Roosevelt’s anxiety to get U.S. troops into…
  • p. 641 …On 8 July the Prime Minister informed Roosevelt that conditions favorable to SLEDGE- HAMMER would probably…
  • p. 642 …on the ~ 4 t h . ~ ‘Ap- parently Roosevelt gave his tentative approval in a telephone conver…
  • p. 753 …This book shows the close relations between Roosevelt and the Committee T o Defend America by…
  • p. 755 …Address by President Roosevelt at Washington, 27 Oct. 1941, in Peace and War, pp. 767-72…
  • p. 756 …Ltr., Roosevelt to Stimson, 18 Sept. 1941,in WP I-General. I I I . Release of…
  • p. 774 …Memo for Roosevelt from Stim- son, 14 Mar. 1942. 163. lbid. 164. History, Sixth Air Force…
  • p. 776 …Elliott Roosevelt, zIst Recon. Sq. to TAG, 8 Sept. 1941; memo for Col. Olds from Capt…
  • p. 779 …Elliott Roosevelt to TAG, 6 July 1941; Atlantic Bridge, pp. 27-29. 117. Ltr., Sec. of…
  • p. 780 …Elliott Roosevelt to T A G , 3 Aug. 1941 (Report # 3 ) ; ltr., Capt. Elliott Roosevelt to…
  • p. 782 …Memo for S / W from President Roosevelt, 6 May 1942, in ATC 321. 199. On the…
  • p. 790 …Mills to TAG, Mac- Arthur for Roosevelt, 11 Feb. 1942; msg. #5, Australia to Marshall, 2…
  • p. 802 …President Roosevelt had approved the induction as early as 18 December 1941, contingent upon approval of…
  • p. 857 …See also Coolidge; Harding; Roosevelt; Wilson. Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment…
  • p. 858 …Erwin, 330, 339-41, 512 Roosevelt, Capt. Elliott, 3 18, 344 Roosevelt, Pres. F.D., 101…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R 11
vulnerable, and in the early evening of 8 December a machine-gun
battery of the 60th Coast Artillery (AA) moved to Nichols Field and
the port area of Manila. Additional if limited equipment was available
in the Philippine Ordnance Depot, and 500 officers and men were
transferred from the 200th Coast Artillery Regiment to man it. Work-
ing almost continuously for thirty-six hours, these men, who had been
hastily organized into the Provisional 200th CA (AA), put together
and installed twelve 3-inch guns, “3 directors and height-finders, 5
AA searchlight units,” and twelve 37-mm. AA guns. By 10 December
new 3-inch batteries were located a t Paranaque, at Paco, and east of
Nielson Airport, and 37-mm. batteries had been installed a t Nichols
Field, a t Nielson Airport, and in the section of Manila known as the
Walled City.57
While these defensive preparations continued and ground crews
worked frantically to make every available aircraft ready for opera-
tion, the chief responsibility of the air arm was reconnaissance. Though
principal reliance was placed in AAF pursuits and Navy patrol
bombers, B-17’s from Del Monte also participated in the effort to gain
intelligence of the enemy’s movements and intentions. At 0730 on 9
December, six of the heavy bombers, commanded by Maj, Cecil
Combs and loaded each with 20 x Ioo-lb. demolition bombs, took off
from their Mindanao base. Having reconnoitered the area in the
vicinity of Catanduanes without finding evidence of enemy activity,
they proceeded to Clark Field, where they landed at 1430.In an action
which was representative of the desperate conditions now governing
operations from bases on Luzon, the planes took off almost imme-
diately and remained in the air until after dark to avoid attack on the
ground. During the afternoon, seven additional B- I 7’s were dispatched
from Del Monte to San marcel in^.^^ A relatively respectable striking
force had thus been brought into position for resistance to such inva-
sion attempts as might be made. Through the first two days of hos-
tilities, however, reports both from the warning net and from patrol
planes revealed principally the confused and nervous state into which
our defenses had been thrown by the enemy. As Admiral Hart later
reported, “an extraordinary crop of incorrect enemy information”
came over the warning net, and there were reports of “enemy sight-
ings when nothing was actually sighted and when a vessel was really
seen she was usually reported in one of two categories: irrespective of
size, she was either a Transport or a Battleship.776sBut during the
2’4

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