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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 303 …of Naval Opera- tions; Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; Gen. George…
  • p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you know, is not only Chief…
  • p. 493 …Admiral King believed that the mines offered a tempting bait to the Japanese who were currently…
  • p. 526 …Hence Admiral King placed a bid for suffi- 461
  • p. 527 …t this stage of the war Admiral King had accepted the belief that his carrier planes…
  • p. 538 …plan by 2 9 June, when Admiral King submitted to the Joint Chiefs a proposal that…
  • p. 607 …type * O n 5 March 1942, Admiral King wrote to General Arnold as follows: “The experience…
  • p. 608 …s.’l A formal request by Admiral King to the Chief of the Army Air Forces…
  • p. 609 …In a letter of 9 March 1942 to Admiral King, he proposed “the estab- lishment of…
  • p. 614 …In June, Admiral King expressed the official Navy position on this point with the utmost clarity…
  • p. 615 …In a memorandum to Admiral King, General McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, on 26 May outlined…
  • p. 616 …viewed as a temporary deta~hment.?~ Admiral King’s reaction to these cautious proposals was expressed…
  • p. 618 …the same words as used by Admiral King a month earlier: the answer to the antisubmarine…
  • p. 621 …On 14 September, General Marshall wrote to Admiral King: “Experience with the First Bomber Command in…
  • p. 622 …T o General Marshall’s proposal of 14 September, Admiral King had replied that, although he…
  • p. 641 …54 A week later General Marshall, Admiral King, Harry Hopkins, and a small staff flew to…
  • p. 645 …that scheduled to operate from the United King- dom. Dry topic or no, organization must figure…
  • p. 684 …the principal air task in the United King- dom had long been conceived as strategic bombardment…
  • p. 707 …establishment of base depots in the United King- dom became the basis of action in January…
  • p. 724 …Implicit in all of the arrangements being made in the United King- dom was the belief…
  • p. 788 …Force, Pt. I ; Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King, First Official Report to the Secretary of the…
  • p. 793 …Memo for Adm, King from C/S, 17 Mar. 1 % ~ . 34. JPS 2I/j/D, 7…
  • p. 795 …4 Aug. 1942. 108. Zbid. 109. Adm. King’s Report on Battle of Midway, incl. in…
  • p. 797 …306, 29 June 1942; memos for Adm. King from Mar- shall, 26 June 1942, and for…
  • p. 802 …1942; CM-IN-0629, Chung- king to AGWAR, # # z , 3 Apr. 1942; memo for Gen. Arnold…
  • p. 805 …Ltr., Arnold to King, 2 5 Feb. 1942. certain evidence from all Allied and enemy sources…
  • p. 806 …Memo for King from McNarney, 26 May 1942. 7 1 . Ltr., King to Marshall, 10 June…
  • p. 807 …Ltr., Marshall to King, 14 Sept. 1942, TAB XIVA, in Bowles report; memo for C G…
  • p. 808 …to notes from Mar- shall and Adm. King). 3 2 . A I c m o for…
  • p. 814 …Forces to the United King- dom, App. A, 19 Aug. 1942. 50. Ltr., Col. H.L…
  • p. 851 …C.E., 48-50 Killin, Pfc, 219 Kilner Board, 1 2 0 Kimbolton, 63 I King…
  • p. 854 …in Chief, 515, 5 2 2 , 544. (see also King); controversy over air power vs. battleship…
P E A R L H A R B O R A N D C L A R K F I E L D
enemy pursuit pilots had so systematically chosen their targets that
seventeen or eighteen of the bombers were de~troyed.~*Damage a t
Iba was, if anything, even more severe. Of the 3d Squadron’s P-~o’s,
apparently only two escaped destruction. Bombs crashed into barracks
and service buildings. Much of the airplane maintenance equipment
was lost, and with it the entire radar installation. Ground crews, who
had thought the approaching planes friendly, suffered heavily.
A bombing attack on Nichols Field in the early morning of 9
December created still more havoc. Bombs fell on a hangar, damaging
several planes and destroying a t least one B- I 8. Several pursuit planes
had been ordered off the ground for night patrol, but the inadequacy
of night-flying facilities and almost impenetrable dust a t the field
resulted in the loss of two or three of these planes and one pilot.5s
In less than one day of hostilities the strength of the Far East Air
Force had been reduced by half. Of its thirty-five B-17’s, not more
than seventeen remained in commission. About fifty-five of the
original P-40’s had been lost either in combat or on the ground. Of the
P-3 5’s, no more than fifteen were operational, and perhaps twenty-five
to thirty miscellaneous aircraft-B- ~o’s,B-I S’s, and observation planes-
also had been destroyed. Casualties were comparably heavy. At
Clark Field alone, 55 officers and men had been killed and more than
IOO wounded, to which numbers were added approximately 25 killed
and 5 0 wounded a t other points.54
The War Department had forwarded instructions to General Mac-
Arthur to carry out the tasks assigned under RAINBOW No. 5 and
to co-operate with the British and Dutch insofar as it was possible
without jeopardizing the accomplishment of his primary mission of
defending the phi lip pine^.^^ Bomber losses, however, left little hope of
effective offensive action, and comparably heavy losses of pursuit air-
craft lent a new desperateness to prospects for defense against an
expected enemy invasion. In a move of adjustment to the losses sus-
tained, the remaining aircraft of the hard-hit 3d Pursuit Squadron
were divided between Lieutenant Wagner’s I 7th Squadron, which
now was transferred to Clark Field, and the 2 1st Squadron at Nichols
Field. At the same time, personnel of the ground echelon were dis-
tributed among these and other units in order to bring them nearer
up to ~trength.‘~Every effort was made to strengthen antiaircraft
defenses, which had proved ineffective against both high-level bomb-
ing and low-altitude attacks. The Manila area seemed particularly
2 1 3

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